Intentional Torts Against the Person: Battery, Assault, False Imprisonment, IIED

The Intent Requirement and Transferred Intent

Every intentional tort begins with intent. A defendant acts with the requisite intent if she acts (1) with the purpose of producing the consequence, or (2) with knowledge that the consequence is substantially certain to result. This is the dual-intent standard the NCBE tests relentlessly. A defendant who fires a gun into a crowded room to scare people, knowing someone will almost certainly be hit, has the intent to commit battery even if she hoped no one would be struck.

Intent is measured subjectively, but the actor need not intend harm — only the contact (or apprehension, or confinement). This is why a practical joker who pulls a chair away as the plaintiff sits down commits battery: he intended the contact with the floor, even though he meant it as a harmless prank. The plaintiff's good-faith mistake about identity does not negate intent either.

Transferred intent allows intent to transfer between victims and between torts. It applies to five torts: battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels. If the defendant intends to commit any one of these against one person but instead accomplishes a different one (or against a different person), intent transfers. Example: D throws a rock at A intending to hit (batter) A, but misses and the rock frightens B, who saw it coming. D is liable to B for assault. Transferred intent does NOT apply to IIED or to conversion.

Battery and Assault Compared

Battery protects against unwanted contact. The prima facie elements are: (1) a harmful or offensive contact, (2) with the plaintiff's person, (3) intent, and (4) causation. 'Offensive' is judged by a reasonable person standard — contact that would offend a person of ordinary sensibilities. The plaintiff's 'person' extends to anything closely connected, such as the plate the plaintiff is holding (the classic Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel grabbing-the-plate case) or a cane in his hand. The plaintiff need not be aware of the contact when it occurs — an unconscious surgical patient operated on without consent has a battery claim.

Assault protects against the mental disturbance of an imminent battery. The elements are: (1) an act creating a reasonable apprehension, (2) of an imminent harmful or offensive contact, (3) intent, and (4) causation. Key distinctions:

• Apprehension is not fear. A frail plaintiff who is confident he can dodge the blow can still recover if he apprehended the contact.
• The plaintiff must be aware of the threat at the time. You cannot be assaulted by a gun pointed at your back you never saw.
• Imminence is essential. Threats of future harm ('I'll beat you next week') are not assault. 'Words alone' usually are not enough — there must be an overt act. But words can negate an assault: brandishing a fist while saying 'If you weren't my friend, I'd hit you' destroys the imminence.
• Apparent ability suffices. Pointing an unloaded gun the plaintiff believes is loaded is assault, because apprehension is judged from the plaintiff's reasonable perspective.

MBE trap: Battery requires no awareness; assault requires awareness. Students reflexively pair them, but the awareness requirement diverges.

False Imprisonment and IIED

False imprisonment requires: (1) an act or omission that confines or restrains the plaintiff (2) to a bounded area, (3) with intent, and (4) causation. The plaintiff must be aware of the confinement at the time OR be harmed by it. The confinement may be accomplished by physical barriers, physical force, threats of force, failure to release (where there is a duty), or invalid assertion of legal authority. Crucially, the area is not 'bounded' if there is a reasonable means of escape the plaintiff knows about — but an escape route is not reasonable if it is dangerous, disgusting, humiliating, or hidden.

Moral pressure and future threats are not enough. 'If you leave I'll fire you' is not false imprisonment because economic coercion does not confine. California recognizes the shopkeeper's privilege: a merchant may detain a suspected shoplifter for a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner, on reasonable suspicion (Cal. Penal Code § 490.5).

Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is the most demanding. Elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress. Conduct is 'extreme and outrageous' only if it exceeds all bounds of decency tolerated in a civilized society — mere insults, indignities, and annoyances do not qualify.

Three factors push borderline conduct over the line: (a) the defendant is a common carrier or innkeeper, (b) the plaintiff is a known-vulnerable group member (young child, pregnant woman, elderly person), or (c) the conduct is continuous/repeated (e.g., relentless debt-collection harassment).

Bystander IIED (third-party): when the defendant harms a third person and the plaintiff suffers distress, the plaintiff generally must show she was (1) present, (2) a close relative of the victim, and (3) the defendant knew of her presence. Note this is distinct from negligent infliction of emotional distress under California's Thing v. La Chusa test, covered in the negligence sections.