Fifth Amendment: Miranda, Self-Incrimination, and Double Jeopardy

Miranda v. Arizona requires that, before a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, police inform him that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him, that he has the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be appointed if he cannot afford one. Both triggers must be present. 'Custody' is an objective inquiry: would a reasonable person in the suspect's position feel that his freedom of movement was restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest?

A routine traffic stop or a Terry stop is generally not custody; an interrogation at the station after arrest is. 'Interrogation' under Rhode Island v. Innis means express questioning OR its functional equivalent — any words or actions by police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Spontaneous, volunteered statements are not the product of interrogation and need no warnings. Routine booking questions (name, address) fall under a booking exception.

The public-safety exception of New York v. Quarles permits un-Mirandized questions reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety (e.g., 'where's the gun?'). A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; silence alone is not a waiver, but a suspect who, after warnings, answers questions has impliedly waived (Berghuis v. Thompkins).

The two Miranda rights have different invocation consequences, a frequently tested distinction. To stop questioning, the suspect must invoke unambiguously — under Berghuis v. Thompkins, simply remaining silent does not invoke the right; the suspect must actually say he wants to remain silent or wants a lawyer. If the suspect invokes the right to remain silent, police must 'scrupulously honor' it, but they may re-approach after a significant time break, fresh warnings, and questioning about a different crime (Michigan v. Mosley).

The right to counsel is stronger: once a suspect unambiguously requests counsel, all interrogation must cease and may not resume — even about unrelated crimes — until counsel is present or the suspect himself reinitiates communication (Edwards v. Arizona; Arizona v. Roberson). This bright-line bar expires only after the suspect has been released from custody for at least 14 days (Maryland v. Shatzer). An ambiguous reference ('Maybe I should talk to a lawyer') does not invoke the right (Davis v. United States), and police need not clarify.

Note the Miranda right to counsel is distinct from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: Miranda's counsel right is non-offense-specific and attaches with custody plus interrogation, while the Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific and attaches at the initiation of formal proceedings.

The privilege against self-incrimination protects a person from being compelled to give testimonial or communicative evidence that is incriminating. It does not protect physical or 'real' evidence: the state may compel a suspect to provide a blood or DNA sample, a handwriting or voice exemplar, to appear in a lineup, or to try on clothing, because these are not testimonial. The privilege can be invoked by a defendant (who need not take the stand at all) or by any witness question-by-question.

The government can compel testimony by granting immunity; use-and-derivative-use immunity (barring use of the testimony and its fruits) is sufficient to supplant the privilege (Kastigar). Double jeopardy (Fifth Amendment, applied to the states) protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense. Jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn, or, in a bench trial, when the first witness is sworn.

Two crimes are the 'same offense' under Blockburger v. United States only if each does NOT require proof of an element the other does not — if each offense has a distinct element, they are different offenses and successive prosecution is allowed. Greater and lesser-included offenses are the same offense. The dual-sovereignty doctrine permits separate prosecutions by different sovereigns (state and federal, or two different states) for the same conduct without violating double jeopardy.

Layered atop Miranda is the independent due-process requirement that any confession be voluntary. Even a perfectly Mirandized statement is inadmissible for all purposes — including impeachment — if it was the product of coercion that overbore the suspect's will, judged by the totality of the circumstances (length and conditions of interrogation, deprivation of food or sleep, threats, and the suspect's characteristics). Critically, coercive POLICE conduct is required: in Colorado v. Connelly the Court held that a confession prompted by a defendant's own mental illness, without police coercion, is not involuntary.

Distinguish the three overlapping doctrines that can each suppress a confession — the Miranda prophylactic rule, the Fifth Amendment voluntariness requirement, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Massiah) once formal proceedings have begun — and analyze each separately on an essay. Several Miranda refinements recur as traps. A suspect's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used against him in some circumstances, and a defendant who takes the stand may be impeached with a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda (Harris), though not with an involuntary one.

Miranda warnings need not be given verbatim so long as the substance is conveyed (Florida v. Powell). Statements obtained by an undercover agent posing as a fellow inmate are not 'interrogation' for Miranda purposes because there is no coercive custodial atmosphere the suspect perceives (Illinois v. Perkins) — but once Sixth Amendment rights have attached, deliberate elicitation by a state agent does violate Massiah.

The double-jeopardy doctrine has its own well-tested exceptions to the bar on retrial. Jeopardy does not bar a retrial after a mistrial declared for 'manifest necessity' (a hung jury is the paradigm) or with the defendant's consent, after a defendant successfully appeals a conviction (he may be retried, though not for a charge on which the jury impliedly acquitted), or after a conviction is reversed for trial error rather than insufficiency of the evidence — a reversal for legally insufficient evidence bars retrial because it is the equivalent of an acquittal (Burks v. United States).

Separate offenses arising from the same act are not the 'same offense' if each requires proof of an element the other does not (Blockburger), so a single act can support prosecution for distinct crimes. California adds statutory protections broader than the federal floor: Penal Code section 654 bars multiple punishment for a single act or indivisible course of conduct (a sentencing rule), and Penal Code section 656 limits successive California prosecution after a prior prosecution in another jurisdiction for the same act, narrowing dual sovereignty as a matter of state statute even though the federal Constitution would permit it.

Finally, on the privilege itself, remember it is personal and cannot be asserted by a corporation or on behalf of another, the act of producing documents can itself be testimonial (the 'act-of-production' doctrine) even when the documents' contents are not privileged, and a witness who has received use-and-derivative-use immunity can be compelled to testify and jailed for contempt if he refuses. Keep the three confession doctrines and the double-jeopardy exceptions on separate tracks to avoid the most common essay errors.

Miranda Invocation: Silence vs. Counsel