Hearsay Exceptions Requiring Unavailability (FRE 804) and the Confrontation Clause

FRE 804(a) lists five ways a declarant is 'unavailable': (1) exempted by a privilege ruling; (2) refusing to testify despite a court order; (3) testifying to not remembering the subject; (4) unable to be present because of death or a then-existing infirmity, physical or mental illness; or (5) absent and the proponent could not procure attendance (and, for some exceptions, testimony) by process or other reasonable means. A party who wrongfully procured the declarant's absence to keep her from testifying cannot claim unavailability.

The four core 804(b) exceptions are: 804(b)(1) former testimony; 804(b)(2) dying declaration; 804(b)(3) statement against interest; and 804(b)(4) statement of personal or family history. 804(b)(6) is forfeiture by wrongdoing.

FRE 804(b)(1) admits testimony given as a witness at a trial, hearing, or lawful deposition, IF it is now offered against a party who had — or, in a civil case, whose PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST had — an opportunity and SIMILAR MOTIVE to develop it by direct, cross, or redirect. Grand jury testimony usually fails because the adverse party had no opportunity to cross-examine. FRE 804(b)(2), the dying declaration, applies only in a HOMICIDE prosecution OR any CIVIL action; the declarant must have spoken while believing death was IMMINENT and the statement must concern the cause or circumstances of the impending death.

Under the FRE the declarant need not actually die, only be unavailable. FRE 804(b)(3), statement against interest, admits a statement so contrary to the declarant's PECUNIARY, PROPRIETARY, or PENAL interest that a reasonable person would not have made it unless true; when offered in a CRIMINAL case to expose the declarant to criminal liability (typically to exculpate the accused), corroborating circumstances must clearly indicate trustworthiness.

Distinguish the statement against interest (non-party declarant, must be unavailable, against interest when made) from a party admission (a party, no unavailability needed, need not be against interest when made).

FRE 804(b)(6) forfeits BOTH the hearsay objection and the Confrontation Clause objection where a party engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the declarant's unavailability (Giles v. California requires that the defendant SPECIFICALLY intended to prevent the witness from testifying). FRE 807, the residual exception, admits a hearsay statement not covered by 803 or 804 if it has equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness (supported by the totality and corroboration), is more probative on the point than other reasonably available evidence, and the proponent gives notice.

The CONFRONTATION CLAUSE is independent of and superimposed on hearsay law. Under Crawford v. Washington (2004), a TESTIMONIAL statement of a declarant who does not testify is inadmissible against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable AND the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine — even if a hearsay exception fits. Davis v. Washington and Michigan v. Bryant: statements to police are NONtestimonial when the primary purpose is to address an ONGOING EMERGENCY (a frantic 911 call), but testimonial when the primary purpose is to establish past facts for later prosecution (a stationhouse interrogation).

Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming hold that forensic lab certificates are testimonial, so the analyst must testify; Ohio v. Clark suggests young children's statements to teachers and most private-party statements are nontestimonial.

The Confrontation Clause is a constitutional overlay that operates independently of the hearsay rules, so a statement can satisfy a hearsay exception perfectly and still be excluded — or, conversely, fail a hearsay exception yet raise no Confrontation problem. Run the Crawford analysis in disciplined steps. Step one: does the Confrontation Clause even apply? It applies ONLY in CRIMINAL cases, ONLY to statements offered AGAINST the accused, and ONLY when the declarant does not testify at the current trial subject to cross. Step two: is the statement TESTIMONIAL?

Crawford v. Washington (2004) left the term partly undefined but its core includes prior testimony (preliminary hearings, grand jury, former trials) and statements taken during police interrogation directed at establishing past events for use in a later prosecution.

Davis v. Washington and Michigan v. Bryant supply the PRIMARY-PURPOSE test: a statement is NONtestimonial when its primary purpose is to enable police to meet an ONGOING EMERGENCY (a frantic 911 call reporting an in-progress assault), and TESTIMONIAL when the primary purpose is to establish or prove past facts potentially relevant to a later prosecution (a calm stationhouse narration after the threat has passed).

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and Bullcoming v. New Mexico hold that forensic laboratory CERTIFICATES are testimonial, so the analyst who performed and certified the test must generally testify; Williams v. Illinois fractured on expert reliance on a non-testifying analyst's data.

Ohio v. Clark holds that a young child's statement to a teacher reporting abuse was nontestimonial and that statements to private individuals are much less likely to be testimonial. Step three: if the statement IS testimonial and the declarant does not testify, it is barred UNLESS the prosecution shows the declarant is unavailable AND the defendant had a PRIOR OPPORTUNITY to cross-examine — even if a hearsay exception otherwise fits. Step four: consider FORFEITURE.

Under FRE 804(b)(6) and Giles v. California, a defendant who engaged in wrongdoing SPECIFICALLY INTENDED to render the declarant unavailable (intimidating or killing a witness) forfeits both the hearsay and the Confrontation objection; mere causation of unavailability without that intent does not forfeit. Work a sequence: a domestic-violence victim screams into a 911 line identifying her attacker mid-assault, then later gives a calm written statement at the station, and at trial refuses to testify.

The 911 statement is nontestimonial under Davis (ongoing emergency) and admissible if a hearsay exception like excited utterance fits; the stationhouse written statement is testimonial under Crawford and barred unless the defendant had a prior chance to cross — but if the prosecution proves the defendant threatened her into silence intending exactly that result, Giles forfeiture admits BOTH.

California criminal trials apply Crawford identically because the Sixth Amendment binds the states, and Proposition 8 cannot override it; meanwhile California's own exceptions are broader — CEC 1230 reaches statements exposing the declarant to social disgrace, and CEC 1242's dying-declaration analog applies in ANY criminal or civil case, not just homicide — so on a California criminal essay always run the Crawford testimonial analysis AFTER clearing the hearsay exception.

FRE 803 vs. FRE 804 and the Confrontation Overlay

California's 804-type exceptions require unavailability (CEC 240 defines it). CEC 1230 (declaration against interest) is BROADER than FRE 804(b)(3) because it also covers statements that would subject the declarant to hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace, and it requires unavailability for all uses.

CEC 1242 is California's dying-declaration analog, but it is BROADER than the FRE: it applies in ANY civil OR criminal case (not just homicide), requiring a sense of immediately impending death and a statement about the cause and circumstances — though the declarant must actually have died is NOT required by the code text; California courts apply it across case types. CEC 1291 admits former testimony where the party against whom it is offered had a right and opportunity to cross with a similar interest and motive.

The federal Confrontation Clause applies in California criminal trials identically (Crawford binds state courts), and Proposition 8 cannot override the federal constitutional right. On a CA criminal essay involving an out-of-court accusation, ALWAYS run Crawford after the hearsay analysis.