13.2 Equality Act 2010 in Legal Services

Why the Equality Act is a Legal Services topic

The FLK1 Legal Services heading names the Equality Act 2010 as functioning legal knowledge in its own right, sitting with the SRA's regulatory role and with overriding legal obligations. Ethics still pervades: SRA Principle 6 (encourage equality, diversity and inclusion) and Code paragraphs 1.1 and 1.5 will often travel with the statute. This independent OpenExamPrep section teaches the Act as a newly qualified solicitor uses it on a client file and in a firm. It is not EHRC or SRA official guidance and does not claim official approval.

Official text: Equality Act 2010, s.4 and Part 2 (prohibited conduct). SRA overlay: Code of Conduct for Solicitors paragraphs 1.1 and 1.5, and the SRA workplace-environment guidance.

The Act binds England, Wales and Scotland (with Northern Ireland remaining on earlier equality legislation). SQE1 is England and Wales. A solicitor providing services to the public is a service-provider under Part 3. A solicitor employing staff, offering pupillage-equivalent training contracts, or deciding who becomes a partner is in Part 5 (work). Both can appear in one vignette: a disabled client and a pregnant trainee on the same Saturday.

The nine protected characteristics

Section 4 lists them. Learn the list accurately; SQE1 distractors add social class, income, political opinion, or nationality as if they were separate s.4 characteristics. Race already includes colour, nationality, and ethnic or national origins (s.9). Religion or belief includes religious belief and philosophical belief (s.10). A philosophical belief must satisfy the Grainger criteria: it is genuinely held; it is not a mere opinion; it concerns a weighty aspect of human life; it attains cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance; and it is worthy of respect in a democratic society. Gender reassignment (s.7) protects a person who is proposing to undergo, is undergoing, or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for reassigning sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex. There is no requirement for a medical diagnosis or surgery. Disability (s.6) is a physical or mental impairment that has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. Cancer, HIV and multiple sclerosis are deemed disabilities. Recurring and progressive conditions can qualify. Pregnancy and maternity have their own ss.17–18 provisions in addition to s.13.

Prohibited conduct — the working tests

Direct discrimination (s.13). A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others because of a protected characteristic. The comparator can be hypothetical. Motive is not a defence: a well-meaning stereotype still counts. Direct discrimination is not justifiable except for age (proportionate means of a legitimate aim) and for specified occupational requirements in Schedule 9. A partner who says "we do not act for gay clients; it is against my beliefs" is treating a person less favourably because of sexual orientation in the provision of a service. A commercial law firm is not a religious organisation with a Schedule 23 services exception merely because one partner attends church.

Indirect discrimination (s.19). A provision, criterion or practice (PCP) applied to people who do not share B's characteristic puts (or would put) people who share it at a particular disadvantage, puts B at that disadvantage, and A cannot show the PCP is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Typical PCPs: "all fee-earners work every other Saturday"; "partners must have been equity partners elsewhere for ten years"; "we only take instructions by video". Each might be justifiable on the facts; none is automatically lawful. Pregnancy and maternity are not s.19 characteristics — use the specific pregnancy provisions instead.

Harassment (s.26). Unwanted conduct related to a relevant characteristic that has the purpose or effect of violating dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. Effect is judged taking into account B's perception, the other circumstances, and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. Sexual harassment is separately defined. Marriage/civil partnership and pregnancy/maternity are not on the s.26 list; other provisions may still catch the facts. From 26 October 2024, employers also have a duty under the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023 to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of employees. A firm that treats harassment as "banter the client pays for" fails the Act and Code paragraph 1.5.

Victimisation (s.27). A subjects B to a detriment because B has done (or A believes B has done or may do) a protected act: bringing proceedings under the Act, giving evidence, making an allegation, or doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with the Act. A trainee who raises a discrimination grievance and is then taken off every interesting file is the exam pattern. A false allegation made in bad faith is not a protected act.

Disability extras. Section 15 (discrimination arising from disability): A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and cannot show a proportionate means of a legitimate aim, unless A did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know of the disability. Example: dismissing a secretary for "too many absences" when the absences arise from a known long-term condition, without considering adjustments. Sections 20–21: the duty to make reasonable adjustments. Three requirements: (1) a PCP that puts disabled people at a substantial disadvantage — take reasonable steps to avoid it; (2) a physical feature — remove it, alter it, or provide a reasonable means of avoiding it; (3) the absence of an auxiliary aid — provide it. Information must be in an accessible format where that is what reasonableness requires. Section 20(7) is the costs rule SQE1 loves: the person under the duty is not entitled to require the disabled person to pay, to any extent, the costs of complying. You cannot add a "BSL interpreter surcharge" to a disabled client's bill because you had to instruct an interpreter to take instructions.

Reasonableness is fact-sensitive: effectiveness, practicability, cost, the firm's resources, and the extent of disruption. A high-street firm can usually move a meeting to a ground-floor room, allow a longer conference, provide large-print papers, or book a British Sign Language interpreter. It may not have to install a lift in a listed three-storey building overnight. What it cannot do is refuse the client because adjustment would be inconvenient.

Impact on the provision of legal services

Part 3, s.29. A service-provider must not discriminate against a person requiring the service by not providing it, as to terms, by terminating, or by any other detriment; must not harass; must not victimise. Legal services offered to the public are a service. Refusing to act, quoting a punitive fee, or ending a retainer because of a protected characteristic is the core pattern. You may still decline instructions for a proper reason: lack of competence (Code 3.2–3.3), own-interest or client conflict (paragraphs 6.1–6.2), or suspected non-genuine instructions (paragraph 3.1). "I do not act for people of that religion" is not a proper reason.

Worked client file. A deaf client books a first meeting about a county court debt claim. The receptionist says the firm "does not do disabled clients" because conferences take longer. That is refusal of a service because of disability (and likely a failure to consider adjustments). The competent response is to book extra time and an interpreter, and not to pass the interpreter's fee to the client as a condition of being seen.

Worked employment file. A vacancy says "recent graduates only, under 25 preferred". Age is a protected characteristic. A maximum-age PCP is indirect (and the "preferred" wording is also a direct-age risk). It is lawful only if the firm can show a proportionate means of a legitimate aim — for example a genuine training-contract structure — not a taste for "young faces in reception".

Public sector equality duty (s.149) binds public authorities, including the SRA, to have due regard to eliminating discrimination, advancing equality of opportunity, and fostering good relations. A private practice firm is not generally a public authority. Do not apply s.149 as if every high-street partnership were a local council. Firms that exercise public functions in a narrow sense can pick up a s.149 duty for that function; SQE1's bread and butter remains Parts 3 and 5 plus the SRA Codes.

The SRA overlay — wider than the Act's floor

Code paragraph 1.1: you do not unfairly discriminate by allowing your personal views to affect your professional relationships and the way you provide your services. That catches conduct the Act might not reach (for example a characteristic the Act does not list) and it catches a solicitor who has not yet completed a prohibited Act but has already let hostility drive the service. Paragraph 1.5: you treat colleagues fairly and with respect; you do not bully, harass, or discriminate against them unfairly; if you are a manager, you challenge behaviour that does not meet that standard. Principle 6 is a duty to encourage equality, diversity and inclusion, not merely to avoid the last moment before a county court claim. The SRA's workplace-environment guidance is explicit that women, disabled solicitors, Black, Asian and minority ethnic solicitors, junior solicitors and LGBTQ+ solicitors are groups about whom it has particular concern.

A newly qualified solicitor who hears a partner racially abuse a trainee in front of a client cannot treat it as "not my file". Paragraph 1.5 and Principle 6 require a challenge proportionate to your role — at minimum, reporting through the firm's process, and considering a report to the SRA if the firm will not act (paragraphs 7.7–7.8).

Exam traps

• Adding social class or political party membership to the s.4 list, or forgetting marriage and civil partnership.
• Justifying direct race or sex discrimination as if it were indirect.
• Treating pregnancy as an indirect-discrimination characteristic.
• Charging the disabled client for the reasonable adjustment.
• Applying marriage-and-civil-partnership protection as a Part 3 services claim.
• Stopping at the Act and ignoring Principle 6 and Code 1.1 / 1.5.
• Confusing the Legal Ombudsman (service) with an Employment Tribunal claim (work) or an SRA misconduct report.