12.1 Freedom of Religion: Establishment & Free Exercise
Key Takeaways
- The Establishment Clause is interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings (Kennedy v. Bremerton, abandoning the Lemon test), and government may not coerce religious participation, as with school-sponsored prayer (Engel v. Vitale; Lee v. Weisman).
- Laws that prefer some denominations over others, including exemptions that turn on theological distinctions, receive strict scrutiny (Larson v. Valente; Catholic Charities Bureau v. Wisconsin, 2025).
- Neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion receive rational basis review (Employment Division v. Smith), but laws that target religion, treat comparable secular activity more favorably, or allow individualized exemptions receive strict scrutiny (Lukumi; Tandon; Fulton).
- A state may not exclude religious schools or organizations from generally available public benefits because of their religious character or use (Trinity Lutheran; Espinoza; Carson v. Makin), and parents may be entitled to notice and an opt-out from instruction that substantially interferes with their children's religious upbringing (Mahmoud v. Taylor, 2025).
- The ministerial exception bars employment-discrimination claims by ministers against religious employers (Hosanna-Tabor; Our Lady of Guadalupe), and RFRA requires the federal government to satisfy strict scrutiny when it substantially burdens religious exercise.
12.1 Freedom of Religion: Establishment & Free Exercise
The First Amendment's Religion Clauses work together: the Establishment Clause keeps government from sponsoring or coercing religion, and the Free Exercise Clause keeps government from targeting or disfavoring it. Both apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Speech rules, which also protect religious expression, are covered in Sections 12.2 and 12.3.
Freedom of Religion: The Dual Guarantees
1. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause forbids the government from establishing an official religion, preferring one religion over another, or coercing religious activity.
- The Historical Practices and Understandings Standard: The Supreme Court has abandoned the three-part Lemon test in favor of an analysis grounded in historical practices and understandings (Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, Town of Greece v. Galloway, American Legion v. American Humanist Ass'n).
- The Anti-Coercion Principle: Government may not coerce individuals to support or participate in religion or religious exercise (Lee v. Weisman - clergy prayer at public middle school graduation unconstitutional; Engel v. Vitale - state-composed prayer in public classrooms unconstitutional).
- Denominational Neutrality: Laws that grant an explicit preference to one religious denomination over another are subject to Strict Scrutiny (Larson v. Valente).
- Public Aid to Religious Institutions and School Vouchers: Public aid programs that are religiously neutral and allocate benefits on equal terms to secular and religious organizations do not violate the Establishment Clause. In particular, school voucher programs where public funds flow to religious schools strictly through the independent private choice of parents are constitutional (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris).
2. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs and religious practices from discriminatory government interference.
- Absolute Protection for Beliefs: Government may never compel or punish religious beliefs, require religious oaths, or declare religious doctrines to be false.
- Neutral Laws of General Applicability (Employment Division v. Smith): A neutral law of general applicability that only incidentally burdens religious practices does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. It is evaluated under Rational Basis Review. In Smith, a state statute criminalizing peyote ingestion was applied constitutionally to deny unemployment benefits to Native Americans who used peyote in religious ceremonies.
- Non-Neutral or Targeted Laws → Strict Scrutiny (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah): If a law specifically targets religious conduct or is designed to suppress religious practices, it triggers Strict Scrutiny.
- The Comparability Principle / Secular Exemptions Rule (Tandon v. Newsom, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia): Government regulations are not neutral and generally applicable—and therefore trigger Strict Scrutiny—whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more favorably than religious exercise. Comparability is judged against the asserted governmental interest. If a public health order exempts retail businesses but caps religious gatherings, it triggers strict scrutiny.
- Discretionary Individualized Exemptions: If a statute provides a formal mechanism for individualized discretionary exemptions, the state cannot refuse to extend that exemption to religious hardship without a compelling interest (Fulton).
- Withholding Public Benefits Based on Religious Status: Denying an otherwise generally available public benefit (e.g., playground resurfacing grants or school tuition assistance) to an institution solely because of its religious identity or religious use violates the Free Exercise Clause (Trinity Lutheran Church, Espinoza, Carson v. Makin).
Applying the Religion Clauses
Recent Free Exercise and Establishment Decisions
- Private prayer by public employees: A public high school football coach's brief, quiet, personal prayer at midfield after games was private religious exercise and speech. The school's concern about violating the Establishment Clause did not justify disciplining him, because no students were coerced to participate (Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 2022).
- Parental opt-outs: A school board's refusal to give parents notice and an opportunity to excuse their elementary-school children from instruction using storybooks with LGBTQ themes burdened the parents' religious exercise by substantially interfering with their children's religious development, as in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). Strict scrutiny applied, and the parents were entitled to a preliminary injunction (Mahmoud v. Taylor, 2025).
- Theological line-drawing: Wisconsin denied a Catholic charity an unemployment-tax exemption for religious organizations because the charity did not proselytize and served people of all faiths. Distinguishing among religious groups based on such theological choices is denominational discrimination that requires strict scrutiny, and the denial failed it (Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, 2025).
- Official hostility: Expressions of hostility toward religion by officials applying a law violate the government's duty of religious neutrality (Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 2018).
- Unemployment benefits: A state may not deny unemployment benefits to a person who refuses work for sincere religious reasons (Sherbert v. Verner, 1963; Thomas v. Review Board, 1981), although Smith permits denying benefits for violating a neutral criminal law.
- Sincerity, not truth: Courts may ask whether a religious belief is sincerely held but may not decide whether it is true (United States v. Ballard, 1944), and a belief need not be shared by all members of a faith (Thomas).
- Tax exemptions: Property-tax exemptions for religious organizations, granted along with exemptions for other nonprofits, do not violate the Establishment Clause (Walz v. Tax Commission, 1970).
Religious Organizations as Employers
- Ministerial exception: The Religion Clauses bar employment-discrimination suits by ministers against their religious employers (Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 2012). What matters is what the employee does: teachers who instruct students in the faith and lead them in prayer can qualify even without a ministerial title or formal training (Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 2020).
- Church autonomy: Civil courts may not resolve disputes over religious doctrine or church governance, and they may decide church property disputes only by neutral principles of law (Jones v. Wolf, 1979).
Religious Freedom Statutes
- RFRA (1993): The federal government may substantially burden a person's religious exercise only if it uses the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest. RFRA protects closely held corporations (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014) and authorizes damages against federal officials in their individual capacities (Tanzin v. Tanvir, 2020). It does not apply to the states (City of Boerne; see Section 7.2).
- RLUIPA (2000): Applies a similar test to state land-use regulation and to prisoners and other institutionalized persons in federally funded programs, protecting, for example, a prisoner's right to grow a short beard for religious reasons (Holt v. Hobbs, 2015).
- Constitutional questions: When an MBE question asks only whether a law violates the Constitution, apply Smith and its exceptions rather than the statutory RFRA test.
| Situation | Test | Key Cases |
|---|---|---|
| Law targets religious practice | Strict scrutiny | Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) |
| Neutral, generally applicable law | Rational basis | Employment Division v. Smith (1990) |
| Comparable secular activity treated better, or individualized exemptions available | Strict scrutiny | Tandon v. Newsom (2021); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021) |
| Exclusion from a public benefit because of religious status or use | Strict scrutiny | Trinity Lutheran (2017); Carson v. Makin (2022) |
| Denominational preference | Strict scrutiny | Larson v. Valente (1982); Catholic Charities Bureau (2025) |
| School-sponsored prayer at school events | Unconstitutional coercion | Engel v. Vitale (1962); Lee v. Weisman (1992); Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000) |
| Legislative prayer and longstanding monuments | Historical practice; generally valid | Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014); American Legion v. American Humanist Ass'n (2019) |
During a respiratory virus outbreak, a municipal emergency health agency issued an order restricting indoor gatherings to slow community disease transmission. The order capped attendance at indoor religious worship services at a maximum of 25 persons, regardless of the size or seating capacity of the sanctuary. The same order permitted indoor retail shopping malls, grocery stores, pharmacies, and hardware stores to operate at 50% of maximum fire code capacity, resulting in hundreds of patrons mingling indoors simultaneously. A local synagogue located in a large building with a 500-seat sanctuary challenged the 25-person cap under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. What standard of judicial review applies, and how should the court rule?
A religious elementary school employed a fifth-grade teacher who taught all subjects, including a daily religion class. She led her students in prayer each day and prepared them to participate in religious services, but her title was 'lay teacher' and she had no formal religious training. After the school declined to renew her contract, she sued the school under a federal employment-discrimination statute, alleging age discrimination. The school moved to dismiss. How should the court rule?
A state exempts from its unemployment-insurance tax any nonprofit organization 'operated primarily for religious purposes.' The state agency denied the exemption to a church-affiliated charity that serves people with disabilities, reasoning that the charity does not try to convert the people it serves and serves people of all faiths, so its purposes are not primarily religious. The charity's faith teaches that charitable service should be offered to everyone without proselytizing. The charity sued, claiming a violation of the First Amendment. How should the court rule?