16.2 Proximate Cause & Intervening Forces
Key Takeaways
- Proximate cause limits liability to harms within the scope of the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence.
- Under the eggshell-skull rule the defendant takes the plaintiff as found and is liable for the full extent of harm even where a pre-existing condition made it far greater than foreseeable.
- A dependent intervening force is a normal response to the situation the defendant created, such as rescue, medical negligence, or subsequent disease, and does not break the causal chain.
- An independent intervening force is unrelated to the defendant's conduct and supersedes only if it was unforeseeable.
- Criminal acts and intentional torts of third parties are generally superseding unless the defendant's negligence created the very risk of that conduct, and unforeseeable acts of God are the other classic superseding cause.
Proximate Cause & Intervening Forces
1. Proximate Cause: The Scope of Foreseeable Risk
Proximate cause (legal cause) evaluates whether the physical harm suffered by the plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligent breach.
Defendant's Negligent Breach
│
├── Foreseeable Type of Harm (Within Scope of Created Risk) ──▶ Proximate Cause Satisfied
└── Highly Unforeseeable / Bizarre Type of Harm ──▶ No Proximate Cause (Wagon Mound)
The Wagon Mound Rule: Foreseeability of the Harm
In the landmark decision Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. (The Wagon Mound No. 1, 1961), the Privy Council repudiated the archaic direct-consequences rule of In re Polemis (which held a defendant liable for all direct physical results, however bizarre). Under the modern rule adopted across American jurisdictions:
- The Rule of Law: An actor is liable only for harm that is within the scope of the foreseeable risks generated by the actor's negligent conduct.
- Application in Wagon Mound: A ship negligently discharged furnace bunkering oil into Sydney Harbour. The oil drifted across the bay and coated the plaintiff's timber wharf. Two days later, molten metal dropped from welding operations onto floating cotton waste, igniting the oil and burning down the wharf. Scientific experts agreed that bunkering oil on water was not reasonably foreseeable to ignite. The court held that while fouling the slipways with oil was foreseeable, destruction by fire was an unforeseeable type of risk; therefore, proximate cause was lacking as a matter of law.
The Triad of Foreseeability: Type vs. Manner vs. Extent
To master proximate cause on the FYLSE, examinees must categorize foreseeability into three distinct dimensions:
Foreseeability Triad
├── 1. TYPE of Harm ──▶ MUST be reasonably foreseeable (Wagon Mound)
├── 2. MANNER of Harm ──▶ Need NOT be foreseeable (Bizarre mechanism irrelevant)
└── 3. EXTENT of Harm ──▶ Need NOT be foreseeable (Eggshell Skull Rule)
| Dimension | Foreseeability Requirement | Doctrinal Rule & Application |
|---|---|---|
| Type of Harm | MANDATORY | The general category of injury (e.g., impact, burn, fall) must be foreseeable. If an actor carelessly stores gasoline in an unventilated basement, fire or explosion is foreseeable; poisoning from an unknown dormant fungus is not. |
| Manner / Mechanism of Harm | IRRELEVANT | If the type of harm is foreseeable, the fact that it occurred through an extraordinary, freakish, or bizarre sequence of events does not shield the defendant from liability (Kinsman Transit Co.). |
| Extent of Harm | IRRELEVANT | Once a foreseeable type of physical harm occurs, the defendant is liable for the full physical magnitude of the injury, even if catastrophic and unforeseeable (Eggshell Skull Rule). |
Illustrative Scenario (Manner of Harm): A city worker negligently leaves an open, unguarded 10-foot manhole in a public sidewalk. A pedestrian carrying a box of kerosene lamps trips on the curb, drops the lamps into the hole, and the shattered kerosene lamp hits an exposed electrical cable, generating an explosive fireball that launches the pedestrian into the air. The city argues that an exploding fireball is an unforeseeable manner of injury from an open manhole. The argument fails: falling and suffering severe physical trauma is the foreseeable type of risk created by leaving an open manhole; the freakish sequence of ignition does not break proximate cause.
2. The Eggshell Skull (Thin Skull) Rule
A universal, ironclad fixture of tort law is the Eggshell Skull Rule (also known as the Thin Skull Doctrine or Talem Qualem Rule):
Defendant Negligently Commits Minor Physical Impact
│
▼
Plaintiff Possesses Latent Pre-Existing Frailty (Hemophilia, Brittle Bones, Aneurysm)
│
▼
Catastrophic, Disproportionate Injury or Death Results
│
▼
RULE: Defendant Takes Plaintiff as Found ──▶ FULLY LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES
The Rule of Law
The defendant takes the plaintiff as the defendant finds the plaintiff. If a defendant commits a negligent act that inflicts foreseeable physical impact or bodily injury upon the plaintiff, the defendant is legally liable for all resulting physical consequences, no matter how severe, unexpected, or extraordinary, and regardless of whether the magnitude of harm was foreseeable.
- Application to Pre-Existing Medical Conditions:
- If Driver negligently rear-ends Pedestrian at 5 mph—an impact that would leave an ordinary person with a minor bruise—but Pedestrian suffers from severe latent osteoporosis or hemophilia, causing extensive internal hemorrhage, permanent paralysis, or death, Driver is liable for 100% of the catastrophic medical expenses and wrongful death damages.
- Latent vulnerabilities include: hemophilia, latent heart disease, dormant cancer triggered by trauma, brittle bone disease (osteogenesis imperfecta), and pre-existing psychiatric fragility.
- Scope and Limitations:
- The eggshell skull rule applies strictly to physical bodily injuries.
- It does not apply to create initial duty or proximate cause for pure emotional distress (NIED) where a bizarre, unusually sensitive bystander suffers severe shock from conduct that would not distress a person of normal sensibilities.
- Once a physical impact/injury occurs, the eggshell skull rule applies with full force to all physical and subsequent psychological sequelae.
3. Intervening Forces: Dependent vs. Independent & Superseding Causes
When evaluating indirect causation, an intervening force is an external force of nature or action of a third party that enters the sequence of events after the defendant has committed the breach. Intervening forces are divided into two fundamental categories:
Intervening Forces
├── Dependent Intervening Forces (Foreseeable Responses) ──▶ DO NOT SEVER LIABILITY (D remains liable)
│ ├── Ordinary Medical Malpractice (Doctor casts broken leg improperly)
│ ├── Rescuer Intervention ("Danger invites rescue" - Rescuer injured or acts)
│ ├── Reflexive / Instinctive Reactions (Crowd flees in sudden panic)
│ └── Weakened Condition Complication (Patient on crutches slips and falls)
└── Independent Superseding Causes (Highly Extraordinary Forces) ──▶ BREAK CAUSAL CHAIN (D relieved)
├── Gross Medical Malpractice / Reckless Treatment (Surgeon operates intoxicated)
├── Unforeseeable Intentional Crimes / Torts of Third Parties (Arsonist sets fire)
└── Extraordinary Acts of God / Natural Catastrophes (Unprecedented 500-year deluge)
Dependent Intervening Forces (Defendant Remains Liable)
A dependent intervening force is a normal, natural, or foreseeable response to the dangerous situation created by the defendant's negligence. Because these responses flow predictably from the initial peril, dependent forces DO NOT break the causal chain:
- Subsequent Ordinary Medical Malpractice (The #1 FYLSE Trap): If a defendant's negligence causes physical injury requiring medical treatment, it is foreseeable as a matter of law that medical personnel may commit ordinary negligence during treatment. The original tortfeasor is liable for the initial injury AND the aggravated harm caused by the doctor's ordinary malpractice.
- Rescuer Intervention ("Danger Invites Rescue"): Under Wagner v. International Ry. Co., it is foreseeable as a matter of law that third parties will attempt to rescue someone placed in peril by the defendant. The original tortfeasor is liable for injuries suffered by the rescuer, and for ordinary negligence committed by the rescuer that accidentally aggravates the victim's harm.
- Instinctive & Escape Reactions: When an actor creates a sudden peril, reflexive human escape reactions (Scott v. Shepherd squib case) are foreseeable dependent forces; the original wrongdoer remains the proximate cause of resulting injuries.
- Secondary Injuries & Weakened Physical Condition: If an injured plaintiff suffers a secondary injury due to their weakened condition (e.g., an accident victim using crutches slips on a clean floor because of impaired balance, fracturing a wrist), the original tortfeasor is liable for the secondary fracture.
Independent Superseding Causes (Severing Liability)
An independent intervening force operates independently of the situation created by the defendant. When an intervening force is so highly extraordinary, bizarre, and unforeseeable that the law deems it unfair to hold the original defendant liable, it is classified as a superseding cause:
- Gross Medical Malpractice: While ordinary medical negligence is a dependent intervening force, gross medical malpractice, reckless conduct, or intentional medical abuse is an independent superseding cause that cuts off the original tortfeasor's liability for subsequent death or catastrophic worsening.
- Unforeseeable Intentional Criminal Acts: Baseline rule: intentional criminal conduct and intentional torts of third parties are superseding causes.
- The Foreseeable Crime Exception (Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448): An intentional criminal act DOES NOT supersede liability if the very risk of that criminal conduct was what made the defendant's act negligent in the first place (e.g., a landlord failing to fix a broken security door in a high-crime apartment building where armed robberies are frequent).
- Extraordinary Acts of God: While ordinary seasonal weather (rain, snow, ice, wind) is foreseeable and does not break causation, an extraordinary, unprecedented natural catastrophe (an 8.5 Richter earthquake or 500-year flood) operates as a superseding cause.
4. Master Comparison Matrix: Causation Doctrines
| Doctrine | Core Legal Standard | Triggering Factual Paradigm | Procedural Effect / Outcome | Landmark Authority |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| "But-For" Test | Sine qua non: harm would not occur without breach. | Single tortfeasor or concurrent necessary causes. | Actual cause established; plaintiff bears burden by preponderance. | Standard common law rule |
| Substantial Factor | Breach was an active, substantial contributing force. | Concurrent independent sufficient causes (merging fires/toxins). | Discards but-for test; all sufficient forces treated as actual causes. | Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. (Wis. 1927) |
| Alternative Liability | Multiple negligent actors; only one caused harm; unknown which. | Simultaneous negligent shooting or identical contemporaneous risk. | Burden of proof shifts to defendants to exonerate themselves. | Summers v. Tice (Cal. 1948) |
| Market Share Liability | Joinder of substantial share of generic fungible market. | Mass exposure to identical chemical formula (DES). | Several liability proportional to market share percentage. | Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (Cal. 1980) |
| Wagon Mound Foreseeability | Scope of foreseeable risk governs proximate cause. | Unusual sequence or unexpected category of damage. | Harm must be of a foreseeable type; manner and extent irrelevant. | The Wagon Mound No. 1 (1961) |
| Eggshell Skull Rule | Defendant takes plaintiff as found (talem qualem). | Plaintiff possesses latent frailty (hemophilia, thin skull). | Defendant liable for full physical extent of injuries. | Universal common law rule |
| Dependent Intervening Force | Normal, foreseeable response to created peril. | Ordinary medical malpractice, rescuer aid, escape panic. | Does not break causation; original defendant remains liable. | Wagner v. International Ry. |
| Superseding Cause | Highly extraordinary, unforeseeable outside force. | Gross malpractice, unforeseeable crime, catastrophic Act of God. | Breaks causal chain; relieves original defendant of subsequent harm. | Restatement § 442 / § 448 |
Arthur and Donald independently went target shooting with high-powered rifles on open public land adjacent to a campground. Both Arthur and Donald acted with gross negligence by firing rapid rounds toward a treeline behind which they knew campers often pitched tents. A stray bullet struck Victor, a camper, in the shoulder, causing permanent nerve damage. The bullet passed entirely through Victor's shoulder and was lost in dense brush, making ballistic identification impossible. Victor sued Arthur and Donald. At trial, Victor proved that both defendants fired simultaneously and negligently in his direction, that only one bullet struck him, and that it was physically impossible to determine which rifle fired it. Donald moved for a directed verdict on the ground that Victor failed to prove Donald fired the bullet. How should the court rule?
A careless driver negligently drifted through a red light at an intersection and collided with a passenger car. The driver of the passenger car sustained a compound fracture of the right femur. An emergency room physician at the local trauma center properly operated on the femur, but during postoperative convalescence, the attending floor nurse negligently administered five times the prescribed dose of a standard post-surgical anticoagulant, causing severe internal gastrointestinal hemorrhaging that required emergency transfusions. In a negligence action by the passenger car driver against the careless driver for all injuries including the internal hemorrhaging, will the careless driver be held liable for the internal hemorrhaging?