12.3 Dynamic Peers, NAT & BOVPN Multi-WAN
Key Takeaways
- Dynamic Peer configurations enable site-to-site IPsec connectivity when remote endpoints lack static public IP addresses, using Domain Name (FQDN) identification and requiring the dynamic peer to initiate Phase 1.
- NAT Traversal (NAT-T) detects intermediate NAT/PAT devices during Phase 1 negotiation (UDP 500) and encapsulates IPsec ESP traffic within UDP port 4500 to prevent packet drops and state corruption.
- Fireware applies NAT inside a tunnel on the NAT tab of the tunnel route: 1-to-1 NAT masquerades the local network behind a range that must contain exactly as many addresses as the Local range, which is how two sites with identical addressing communicate, while outgoing dynamic NAT translates many local hosts to a single address across the tunnel.
- BOVPN Multi-WAN integration allows administrators to configure multiple gateway endpoint pairs per Phase 1 gateway, supporting automated tunnel failover and fallback across redundant ISP connections.
- The Firebox System Manager (FSM) VPN Diagnostic Report and IKE debug trace logging provide granular visibility into Phase 1 authentication and Phase 2 proposal negotiations.
12.3 Dynamic Peers, NAT & BOVPN Multi-WAN
Quick Answer: Connecting modern distributed networks requires handling complex WAN conditions, including dynamic ISP addressing, carrier-grade NAT, and multi-homed ISP redundancy. Fireware accommodates dynamic WAN endpoints through Dynamic Peer configurations, where the dynamic peer initiates Phase 1 using Domain Name (FQDN) identification. When intermediate routers perform Port Address Translation, NAT Traversal (NAT-T) encapsulates IPsec ESP packets inside UDP port 4500. A separate and frequently confused topic is NAT inside the tunnel: on the NAT tab of a tunnel route you can enable 1-to-1 NAT (masquerading your local range behind a different range so two sites with identical addressing can still talk) or outgoing dynamic NAT (translating many local hosts to a single address across the tunnel). For mission-critical resilience, BOVPN Multi-WAN configures multiple gateway endpoint pairs to execute automated tunnel failover across redundant WAN links. When negotiations stall, engineers pinpoint root causes using the FSM VPN Diagnostic Report and IKE debug trace logging.
Dynamic Peer Configuration & Domain Identification
In standard site-to-site VPN deployments, both peering firewalls maintain static public IPv4 addresses assigned by their respective Internet Service Providers. However, small satellite offices, retail kiosks, pop-up clinics, and temporary construction trailers frequently utilize lower-cost broadband uplinks—such as residential cable modems, DSL connections, or 5G cellular gateways—that receive dynamic, unpredictable public IP addresses via DHCP or PPPoE.
The Asymmetric Initiator/Responder Problem
When a remote peer possesses a dynamic IP address, the central static gateway (the corporate data center or headquarters) cannot initiate the IPsec VPN tunnel because it has no reliable destination IP address to target. To solve this dilemma, Fireware establishes an asymmetric Initiator / Responder relationship:
- Headquarters Firebox (Responder): Configured with a static public IP address. In its BOVPN Gateway definition, the remote gateway endpoint is configured as a Dynamic IP peer. The headquarters Firebox never initiates tunnel establishment; it listens passively and waits for the remote dynamic peer to initiate Phase 1.
- Branch Firebox (Initiator): Configured with the headquarters static public IP address (or static FQDN) as its remote gateway endpoint. The branch Firebox acts as the proactive initiator, triggering Phase 1 whenever outbound traffic matches the tunnel routes or keepalives fire.
Phase 1 Identity Types: FQDN and User FQDN
In standard static-to-static VPNs, Fireware identifies peers during Phase 1 by validating their source IPv4 addresses. Because a dynamic peer's source IP changes unpredictably, the firewalls cannot rely on IP addresses for identity verification. Instead, Fireware requires administrators to configure alternative Phase 1 Identity Types:
- Domain Name (FQDN): The dynamic peer presents a fully qualified domain name (e.g.,
branch42.corp.example.com). The responder validates that the incoming FQDN matches the authorized peer identity string in its gateway configuration. - User FQDN (User Domain Name / Email Format): The peer presents an identity formatted as an email address (e.g.,
branch42@vpn.corp.example.com). This format is frequently used when multiple dynamic branch gateways authenticate against a single central hub.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DYNAMIC PEER BOVPN IDENTITY ARCHITECTURE |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| [ Dynamic Branch Firebox (Initiator) ] |
| ├── WAN IP: Dynamic DHCP (e.g., 73.18.94.112 - changes unpredictably) |
| ├── Gateway Configuration: Remote Endpoint = HQ Static IP (203.0.113.1) |
| └── Phase 1 Identity: Domain Name (FQDN) = "branch42.corp.example.com" |
| │ |
| ▼ Initiates Phase 1 via UDP 500 |
| [ Headquarters Firebox (Responder) ] |
| ├── WAN IP: Static (203.0.113.1) |
| ├── Gateway Configuration: Remote Endpoint = [ Dynamic IP Address ] |
| └── Phase 1 Match Rule: Accept Identity FQDN = "branch42.corp.example.com" |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Dynamic DNS Integration & Keepalives
If both endpoints possess dynamic IP addresses, a direct IPsec BOVPN cannot establish using standard static responder logic unless a Dynamic DNS (DDNS) service (e.g., DynDNS, No-IP) is deployed. Each Firebox updates a public DDNS record upon obtaining a new WAN lease. The remote gateway endpoints are configured with the corresponding dynamic FQDNs, and the Firebox resolves the records via DNS before initiating Phase 1.
To maintain tunnel persistence when traffic is idle, the dynamic peer must be configured with Dead Peer Detection (DPD) or VPN Keepalives. These periodic lightweight probes keep the upstream carrier state open and notify the headquarters responder of the dynamic peer's current IP address and port.
NAT Traversal (NAT-T): Architecture & Mechanisms
One of the most persistent obstacles in enterprise VPN engineering is deploying a Firebox behind an upstream third-party edge router, cable modem, or Carrier-Grade NAT (CGNAT) gateway that performs Network Address Translation / Port Address Translation (NAT/PAT).
Why Traditional IPsec ESP Breaks Across NAT/PAT
Traditional IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) operates directly over IP as IP Protocol 50. Unlike TCP (Protocol 6) or UDP (Protocol 17), the ESP header contains no Layer 4 port numbers:
- Standard NAT routers multiplex multiple internal private IP hosts across a single public IPv4 address by rewriting Layer 4 TCP/UDP port numbers (PAT).
- When an upstream NAT router receives an outbound ESP (Protocol 50) packet, it has no port fields to inspect or translate. Some routers drop the packet outright; others assign a temporary single-entry mapping.
- Furthermore, if multiple internal devices establish concurrent IPsec tunnels through the same upstream NAT router, the router cannot demultiplex incoming reply packets because all returning ESP packets share IP Protocol 50 without unique port identifiers.
- In addition, if Phase 1 uses IP address hashing for integrity verification, any intermediate NAT modification alters the IP header and breaks the cryptographic hash, causing authentication failure.
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
participant Branch as Branch Firebox (Behind NAT)
participant NAT as Upstream ISP NAT Router
participant HQ as Headquarters Firebox (Public IP)
Note over Branch,HQ: Step 1: Initial Discovery on UDP 500
Branch->>NAT: IKE Phase 1 (Includes NAT-D Payloads) [Src: 192.168.1.10:500 -> Dst: 203.0.113.1:500]
NAT->>HQ: Rewrites IP [Src: 198.51.100.5:500 -> Dst: 203.0.113.1:500]
HQ-->>NAT: Responds with NAT-D Payloads [Src: 203.0.113.1:500 -> Dst: 198.51.100.5:500]
NAT-->>Branch: Forwards Response [Src: 203.0.113.1:500 -> Dst: 192.168.1.10:500]
Note over Branch,HQ: Step 2: NAT Detected! Transition to UDP Port 4500
Branch->>NAT: IKE Handshake Transitions to Port 4500 [Src: 192.168.1.10:4500 -> Dst: 203.0.113.1:4500]
NAT->>HQ: PAT Rewrites Source Port [Src: 198.51.100.5:61024 -> Dst: 203.0.113.1:4500]
HQ-->>NAT: Replies to Translated Port [Src: 203.0.113.1:4500 -> Dst: 198.51.100.5:61024]
NAT-->>Branch: Rewrites to Internal Port [Src: 203.0.113.1:4500 -> Dst: 192.168.1.10:4500]
Note over Branch,HQ: Step 3: Data Plane UDP-Encapsulated ESP
Branch->>HQ: Transmits Data: ESP Packet Wrapped Inside UDP Port 4500 Header
HQ-->>Branch: Replies: ESP Packet Wrapped Inside UDP Port 4500 Header
The NAT-T Negotiation Flow: UDP 500 to UDP 4500
NAT Traversal (NAT-T - standardized in RFC 3947 and RFC 3948) resolves this architectural incompatibility by encapsulating raw ESP packets inside standard Layer 4 UDP headers:
- Discovery via NAT-D (UDP Port 500): Phase 1 begins normally over UDP port 500. During the initial handshake, both firewalls include cryptographic hash payloads known as NAT-Discovery (NAT-D) payloads. These payloads contain the hash of the local IP address and port as seen by the sender.
- NAT Detection: When the responder receives the NAT-D payload, it computes the hash of the source IP and port from which the packet actually arrived. If an upstream device performed NAT, the computed hash will not match the hash inside the payload. Both endpoints recognize that an intermediate NAT device exists between them.
- Port Float to UDP 4500: The moment NAT is detected, the firewalls dynamically float their communications from UDP port 500 to UDP port 4500. The remaining Phase 1 authentication packets and all subsequent Phase 2 negotiations execute over UDP 4500.
- UDP Encapsulation of ESP: During the Phase 2 data plane transmission, the Firebox wraps every outbound ESP packet inside a UDP header with destination port 4500. Because the packet now possesses standard UDP headers, the upstream PAT router can track, rewrite, and multiplex port numbers normally.
NAT Keepalive Packets & State Maintenance
Upstream commercial NAT routers maintain state table entries for active UDP sessions. Because UDP is connectionless, NAT routers flush idle translation entries aggressively (frequently after only 30 to 60 seconds of inactivity). If the state expires, the headquarters firebox can no longer send inbound traffic to the branch.
To prevent state table collapse, Fireware transmits automated NAT Keepalive packets across UDP 4500 at regular intervals (default: every 20 seconds). These lightweight, 1-byte dummy packets refresh the upstream router's translation table without consuming WAN bandwidth.
| Attribute / Parameter | Native IPsec (No NAT) | NAT Traversal (NAT-T Active) |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 Initial Port | UDP Port 500 | UDP Port 500 (Initial discovery) |
| Phase 1 Established Port | UDP Port 500 | Floats to UDP Port 4500 |
| Data Encapsulation Protocol | Raw ESP (IP Protocol 50) | UDP Encapsulated ESP (UDP 4500) |
| Intermediate PAT Support | Incompatible; packets frequently dropped | Fully supported; ports translated cleanly |
| Packet Overhead | Baseline ESP header (36-44 bytes) | Baseline ESP + 8-byte UDP header |
| Keepalive Requirement | DPD optional (RFC 3706) | Periodic UDP keepalives mandatory (20s) |
Branch Office VPN and NAT: Translating Inside the Tunnel
NAT-T solves a problem outside the tunnel — an intermediate device rewriting the outer packet headers. A completely different problem arises inside the tunnel, and Fireware solves it on the NAT tab of the tunnel route settings. The exam objectives list "Branch Office VPN and NAT" as its own item precisely because candidates confuse the two.
The Overlapping Network Problem
Policy-based BOVPN tunnel routes pair a local network with a remote network. If Site A and Site B both use 192.168.1.0/24 — which happens constantly after an acquisition, or when two sites were each built from the same default template — the pairing is meaningless. A host at Site A that sends a packet to 192.168.1.50 believes the destination is on its own local subnet, so the packet never reaches the Firebox at all.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OVERLAPPING NETWORKS ACROSS A BOVPN TUNNEL |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| SITE A 192.168.1.0/24 <==== IPsec Tunnel ====> SITE B 192.168.1.0/24 |
| |
| WITHOUT NAT: 192.168.1.20 -> 192.168.1.50 is treated as local. Packet never |
| leaves the Site A LAN. The tunnel is never used. |
| |
| WITH 1-TO-1 NAT ON THE TUNNEL ROUTE: |
| Site A masquerades its local range as 192.168.100.0/24 |
| Site B masquerades its local range as 192.168.200.0/24 |
| 192.168.1.20 -> 192.168.200.50 ... arrives at Site B as 192.168.1.50 |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
1-to-1 NAT Through a BOVPN Tunnel
When the network range on the remote network is the same as the range on the local network, you configure the VPN to use 1-to-1 NAT. In the Tunnel Route Settings dialog box on each Firebox you select the 1:1 NAT check box and type the masqueraded IP address range in the adjacent text box.
[!IMPORTANT] The count must match exactly. WatchGuard states that "the number of IP addresses in this text box must be exactly the same as the number of IP addresses in the Local text box at the top of the dialog box." A
/24local network must be masqueraded behind a/24range; you cannot masquerade a/24behind a/28. This one-to-one correspondence is what makes the translation deterministic and bidirectional — exactly as it is for the interface-level 1-to-1 NAT covered in Section 4.3.
Each side is configured independently, and each side's masqueraded range must be unique in the combined topology. Hosts at Site B address Site A's servers by their masqueraded addresses, and the Firebox rewrites them back on arrival.
Outgoing Dynamic NAT Through a BOVPN Tunnel
Where 1-to-1 NAT translates a range of addresses to a different range of the same size, dynamic NAT translates many local addresses to one. Fireware supports configuring outgoing dynamic NAT through a branch office VPN tunnel, which is useful when:
- The remote peer — often a partner, a vendor, or a cloud service — will only accept traffic from a single agreed source address.
- You want the far side to see one predictable address rather than your whole internal range.
- The remote peer's addressing cannot accommodate a masqueraded range large enough for 1-to-1 NAT.
Both options live on the NAT tab when you add or edit a tunnel route, and Fireware enables them only when the address types and tunnel direction you selected are compatible.
| Requirement | Mechanism | Where Configured | Key Constraint |
|---|---|---|---|
| An intermediate router performs NAT/PAT on the path | NAT Traversal (NAT-T) | Automatic; negotiated with NAT-D payloads on UDP 500, then floats to UDP 4500 | Applies to the outer packet, not the protected networks |
| Local and remote protected networks overlap | 1-to-1 NAT on the tunnel route | Tunnel Route Settings > 1:1 NAT check box | The masqueraded range must contain exactly as many addresses as the local range |
| The far side must see a single source address | Outgoing dynamic NAT on the tunnel route | Tunnel route NAT tab | Available only when the address types and tunnel direction are compatible |
BOVPN Integration with Multi-WAN & Tunnel Redundancy
Enterprise locations frequently deploy redundant Internet service providers—such as a primary Dedicated Internet Access (DIA) fiber circuit paired with a secondary business broadband or 5G link—managed through Fireware's Multi-WAN engine. BOVPN integrates natively with Multi-WAN to provide automated site-to-site tunnel failover.
Gateway Endpoint Pairs & Topologies
In Fireware, tunnel redundancy is achieved by configuring multiple Gateway Endpoint Pairs within a single BOVPN Gateway object. A Gateway Endpoint Pair defines an explicit mapping between a local external interface and a remote gateway public IP:
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOVPN MULTI-WAN ENDPOINT PAIR TOPOLOGY |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| Site A (Headquarters) Site B (Branch Office) |
| ├── Primary WAN: 203.0.113.1 (Interface 0) ├── Primary WAN: 198.51.100.1 |
| └── Secondary WAN: 203.0.113.2 (Interface 2) └── Secondary WAN: 198.51.100.2|
| |
| [ Gateway Endpoint Pair Configurations ] |
| • Pair 1 (Primary): Local 203.0.113.1 <=======> Remote 198.51.100.1 |
| • Pair 2 (Backup): Local 203.0.113.2 < - - - > Remote 198.51.100.2 |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Failover Modes, Dead Peer Detection (DPD) & Fallback Behavior
Administrators can structure Multi-WAN BOVPN failover into two distinct operational strategies:
- Primary/Backup Endpoint Pairs: The administrator explicitly designates Pair 1 as the primary path and Pair 2 as the backup path. All VPN traffic traverses Pair 1. If Pair 1 fails, Fireware shifts the tunnel to Pair 2.
- Endpoint Health Probing via Dead Peer Detection (DPD): The Firebox utilizes RFC 3706 DPD to actively monitor the responsiveness of the remote gateway. If the remote peer fails to acknowledge three consecutive DPD keepalives, the Firebox marks the endpoint pair down and triggers immediate failover to the secondary endpoint pair.
- Fallback to Primary Endpoint: Once the primary ISP circuit recovers, Fireware provides two options:
- Immediate Fallback: The Firebox tears down the backup tunnel and immediately renegotiates the Phase 1 SA across the primary link.
- Inactivity Fallback: The Firebox waits until traffic across the tunnel drops to zero before switching back, preventing disruption to active real-time sessions (such as VoIP calls).
| Multi-WAN BOVPN Mode | Traffic Distribution | Failover Trigger Mechanism | Best Deployed For |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary / Backup Pairs | 100% active on primary; backup stays idle | DPD failure / Link Monitor probe drop | Active/Passive WAN circuits (e.g., Fiber + 5G) |
| Round-Robin Multi-WAN | Distributes tunnels across WAN interfaces | Multi-WAN route table re-evaluation | Multiple active tunnels to distinct branch sites |
| SD-WAN Policy Selection | Dynamic path selection based on jitter/loss | Real-time latency/jitter metric threshold | High-priority VoIP and video streaming over VPN |
Diagnostic Tools & Systematic Troubleshooting Workflows
When a Branch Office VPN fails to establish or abruptly drops traffic, network administrators must follow a structured diagnostic workflow. Guessing configuration settings often compounds errors. Fireware provides powerful diagnostic tools designed to pinpoint root causes rapidly.
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STRUCTURED BOVPN DIAGNOSTIC WORKFLOW |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| Step 1: Inspect Physical & Logical WAN Connectivity |
| ├── Can local and remote gateways ping each other's public WAN IPs? |
| └── Are UDP port 500 and UDP port 4500 open across intermediate ISPs? |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| Step 2: Generate FSM VPN Diagnostic Report |
| ├── Examine Gateway status (Phase 1 SA active or expired?) |
| └── Examine Tunnel status (Phase 2 SAs matched? Check SPIs & byte counters) |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| Step 3: Enable IKE Debug Trace Logging in Traffic Monitor |
| ├── Navigate: System > Diagnostic Log Level > VPN > IKE -> Set to DEBUG |
| └── Analyze real-time handshake payloads: PSK, DH group, proposal exchanges |
| │ |
| ▼ |
| Step 4: Remediate Identified Root Cause |
| └── Resolve PSK mismatch, proposal disparity, or Proxy ID subnet conflict |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Firebox System Manager (FSM) VPN Diagnostic Report
The VPN Diagnostic Report is the single most valuable troubleshooting utility for BOVPN in Fireware. Accessible via Firebox System Manager > View > Diagnostic Tasks > VPN Diagnostic Report (or via the Fireware Web UI), this tool executes an automated diagnostic audit of the selected gateway and tunnel:
- Configuration Validation: Validates local settings against known Fireware configuration rules.
- Endpoint Reachability: Tests Layer 3 routing and DNS resolution for remote gateway endpoints.
- SA State Inspection: Displays the exact status of Phase 1 and Phase 2 Security Associations, including inbound and outbound SPI values, cryptographic transforms, and negotiation timestamps.
- Error Diagnostics: Highlights explicit errors, such as peer identifier mismatches, proposal mismatches, or Pre-Shared Key failures.
IKE Trace Logging in Traffic Monitor (Diagnostic Log Levels)
By default, Fireware logs VPN events at the Information level, which reports high-level connection successes and generic failures. When diagnosing complex negotiation stalls, administrators must elevate the diagnostic logging level:
- In Policy Manager or Web UI, navigate to System > Diagnostic Log Level.
- Expand the VPN category and locate IKE.
- Change the slider from Information to Debug.
- Open Traffic Monitor in Firebox System Manager and filter logs by
ikeor the remote peer IP address.
Debug logging outputs raw, granular IKE state machine events, revealing individual proposal exchanges, vendor ID strings, and precise failure notifications.
[!CAUTION] IKE Debug logging generates intense log volume during busy production hours. Always return the IKE diagnostic log level to Information immediately after troubleshooting is complete to prevent log server saturation and unnecessary storage consumption.
Comprehensive Error Taxonomy & Remediation Matrix
The following table outlines the most common BOVPN failure modes encountered on the WatchGuard certification exam and in production enterprise environments:
| Log Message / Error Symptom | Negotiation Phase | Underlying Root Cause | Definitive Technical Resolution |
|---|---|---|---|
Authentication failed / Hash verification failed | Phase 1 (IKE) | Pre-Shared Key Mismatch: The local and remote PSKs do not match identically byte-for-byte. | Re-enter the Pre-Shared Key on both gateways. Ensure no trailing spaces or special character truncation. |
No proposal chosen (during Phase 1) | Phase 1 (IKE) | Phase 1 Transform Disparity: Mismatched encryption (e.g., AES-256 vs AES-128), hash (SHA-256 vs SHA-1), or DH group (Group 14 vs Group 2). | Compare Phase 1 Gateway proposals on both firewalls and align ciphers, hashes, and DH groups identically. |
Peer identifier mismatch / Invalid ID | Phase 1 (IKE) | Identity String Mismatch: Remote peer sent an unexpected ID (e.g., local expects IP, remote sent FQDN string). | Verify Phase 1 Local and Remote ID types. Ensure Domain Name or User FQDN strings match exactly. |
No proposal chosen (during Quick Mode) | Phase 2 (Child SA) | PFS or Phase 2 Proposal Disparity: One peer has Perfect Forward Secrecy enabled while the other has it disabled, or DH groups differ. | Ensure Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is either enabled on both endpoints with matching DH groups, or disabled on both. |
Invalid ID / Proxy ID mismatch / Traffic dropped | Phase 2 (Child SA) | Tunnel Route (Subnet Pair) Conflict: Local and remote subnets are not configured as exact inverted mirror images. | Verify tunnel routes. If Local is 10.0.1.0/24 and Remote is 10.0.20.0/24, remote peer must configure Local 10.0.20.0/24 and Remote 10.0.1.0/24. |
IKE message timeout / Retransmit limit reached | Phase 1 (IKE) | ISP Packet Drop or Firewall Block: UDP 500/4500 is blocked by an upstream ISP or intermediate carrier router. | Verify upstream firewall rules. Ensure UDP port 500, UDP port 4500, and IP protocol 50 (ESP) are permitted. |
Tunnel up, but ping fails between hosts | Data Plane | Firewall Policy / Host Firewall Block: Host Windows Firewall dropping ICMP, or BOVPN-Allow disabled without custom policies. | Inspect Traffic Monitor for denied packets. Verify destination host firewall permits ICMP and verify custom BOVPN policies exist. |
After an acquisition, a company needs a branch office VPN between two sites that both use the 192.168.1.0/24 network. The tunnel comes up, but no traffic ever crosses it. Which Fireware feature resolves this, and what constraint applies to its configuration?
A branch office Firebox is deployed behind an upstream ISP cable modem performing Carrier-Grade NAT (CGNAT), leaving the Firebox with a private IPv4 WAN address. When establishing a BOVPN tunnel to corporate headquarters, how does NAT Traversal (NAT-T) ensure encrypted traffic successfully traverses the upstream NAT device?
While reviewing Traffic Monitor logs during a failed BOVPN tunnel initialization between a Firebox and a partner gateway, an administrator sees that Phase 1 establishes successfully, but Phase 2 fails with the error 'Invalid ID: local 192.168.10.0/24 remote 10.10.0.0/16'. At the Firebox, the tunnel route is configured as Local: 192.168.10.0/24 and Remote: 10.10.20.0/24. What is the root cause of this failure?
An enterprise network engineer must configure a Branch Office VPN between corporate headquarters (with a static public IP) and a remote temporary field trailer connected via a mobile cellular modem that receives a dynamic, unpredictable public IP address. Which configuration strategy must be implemented on both Fireboxes?