9.3 Fifth Amendment Miranda, Sixth Amendment Counsel & Double Jeopardy
Key Takeaways
- Fifth Amendment Miranda protections apply to Custodial Interrogations by known state agents; custody is evaluated objectively (restraint akin to formal arrest under Howes and J.D.B.), and interrogation encompasses express questioning or functional equivalents reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses (Innis).
- Invoking the Right to Remain Silent requires an unambiguous declaration (Thompkins); once scrupulously honored, police may re-question after significant time upon fresh warnings regarding a separate crime (Mosley). Invoking the Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel (Edwards) requires immediate cessation of all questioning across all offenses until counsel is present or a 14-day break in custody occurs (Shatzer).
- The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel attaches automatically at formal adversarial judicial proceedings and is strictly offense-specific (Texas v. Cobb); Ineffective Assistance of Counsel requires showing deficient performance below professional reasonableness and resulting prejudice (Strickland).
- The Confrontation Clause (Crawford) bars testimonial out-of-court statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had prior cross-examination opportunity; 911 calls during ongoing emergencies are non-testimonial under the primary purpose test.
- Double Jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled/sworn (or first witness in bench trial); under Blockburger, offenses are the same unless each requires proof of an additional element that the other does not; retrial is permitted following manifest necessity (hung jury) or defense appeals not grounded in evidentiary insufficiency.
9.3 Fifth Amendment Miranda, Sixth Amendment Counsel & Double Jeopardy
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments establish foundational constitutional safeguards governing police interrogation, trial representation, witness confrontation, and finality in criminal prosecutions.
1. Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination & Miranda
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, requiring prophylactic procedural warnings prior to questioning.
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| MIRANDA TRIGGER PREREQUISITES |
| |
| MIRANDA WARNINGS REQUIRED ONLY UPON CONCURRENCE OF BOTH ELEMENTS: |
| |
| [ ELEMENT 1: CUSTODY ] |
| - Objective standard: Would a reasonable person in the suspect's position |
| feel there was a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree |
| associated with a formal arrest? (Howes v. Fields, Stansbury). |
| - Age is considered if known or objectively apparent (J.D.B. v. N.C.). |
| - NOT CUSTODY: Routine traffic stops (Berkemer), voluntary station-house |
| interviews, routine probation meetings. |
| |
| [ ELEMENT 2: INTERROGATION ] |
| - Express questioning OR any words/actions by police that police know or |
| should reasonably know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating |
| response (Rhode Island v. Innis). |
| - NOT INTERROGATION: Routine booking questions (Pennsylvania v. Muniz), |
| spontaneous/volunteered statements, undercover informant conversations |
| where suspect does not know they are speaking to police (Perkins). |
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The Public Safety Exception (New York v. Quarles)
Police may ask questions reasonably prompted by an immediate and overriding concern for public safety (such as locating a discarded loaded firearm in a public supermarket) without first administering Miranda warnings. Incriminating responses are fully admissible.
2. Invocation and Waiver of Miranda Rights
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| INVOCATION OF MIRANDA RIGHTS COMPARISON |
| |
| RIGHT INVOKED RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL (5TH) |
| -------------------- -------------------------- ---------------------- |
| Invocation Standard Must be UNAMBIGUOUS and Must be UNAMBIGUOUS |
| explicit (Berghuis v. and explicit (Davis v. |
| Thompkins). Remaining United States: "Maybe I |
| silent is NOT invocation. need a lawyer" fails). |
| Police Obligation Must "scrupulously honor" ALL questioning must |
| Upon Invocation the request; immediately IMMEDIATELY CEASE on |
| cease questioning. ALL offenses. |
| Permissible Police may re-initiate Police CANNOT re-open |
| Re-Interrogation questioning IF: (Mosley) questioning unless: |
| (1) Significant time elapsed (1) Suspect initiates |
| (e.g., 2+ hours); further communication; |
| (2) Fresh Miranda warnings; OR |
| (3) Questioning involves a (2) 14-day break in |
| DIFFERENT CRIME. custody (Shatzer). |
| Scope of Protection Specific to that interview NON-OFFENSE SPECIFIC: |
| session. Bars questioning on ALL |
| crimes (Edwards). |
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Use of Statements Taken in Violation of Miranda
- Case-in-Chief: Inadmissible.
- Impeachment (Harris v. New York): Voluntary confessions obtained in technical violation of Miranda may be used to impeach the defendant's trial testimony if the defendant takes the witness stand and lies.
- Physical Fruits (United States v. Patane): Physical evidence discovered as a result of an unwarned, voluntary statement is admissible (the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not suppress physical fruits of mere Miranda violations).
3. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
While the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is a non-offense-specific Miranda safeguard, the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel is an independent constitutional trial guarantee.
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| FIFTH AMENDMENT VS. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL |
| |
| DIMENSION 5TH AMENDMENT (MIRANDA) 6TH AMENDMENT |
| -------------------- -------------------------- ---------------------- |
| Source & Nature Prophylactic rule derived Direct text of Sixth |
| from 5th Amend. Privilege. Amendment. |
| When it Attaches Custodial Interrogation Formal adversarial |
| (prior to formal charges). proceedings (indictment,|
| arraignment, info). |
| Scope of Offenses NON-OFFENSE SPECIFIC: OFFENSE SPECIFIC: |
| Bars questioning on ALL Bars questioning ONLY |
| crimes (Edwards). on charged offense |
| (Texas v. Cobb). |
| Application to Applies only to known Applies to both open |
| Undercover Agents police interrogators (not police and undercover |
| informants under Perkins). informants (Massiah). |
| Critical Stages Interrogation only. Preliminary hearings, |
| lineups (post-charge), |
| pleas, trial, sentencing|
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The Offense-Specific Rule (Texas v. Cobb)
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is strictly offense-specific.
- Attachment of the Sixth Amendment right on a charged offense (e.g., burglary) does not attach to an uncharged offense (e.g., capital murder arising from the same burglary) unless the uncharged offense constitutes the "same offense" under the Blockburger test.
- Police may question an indicted defendant outside the presence of counsel regarding unrelated, uncharged criminal conduct without violating the Sixth Amendment.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Strickland v. Washington)
To overturn a conviction based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC), a defendant must satisfy a strict two-prong test:
- Deficient Performance: Counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Judicial scrutiny is highly deferential, indulging a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and sound trial strategy.
- Prejudice: There is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome).
- Plea Bargain Context (Hill v. Lockhart, Missouri v. Frye): To prove prejudice regarding a rejected or accepted plea offer, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that they would have accepted the plea or proceeded to trial but for counsel's deficient advice.
4. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause (Crawford v. Washington)
Under the Confrontation Clause, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against them.
- The Crawford Doctrine: Out-of-court testimonial statements by a declarant are inadmissible against a criminal defendant under the Sixth Amendment unless:
- The declarant is unavailable at trial; and
- The defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
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| TESTIMONIAL VS. NON-TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS |
| |
| PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST (Davis v. Washington, Michigan v. Bryant) |
| |
| [ NON-TESTIMONIAL ] |
| - Primary purpose is to assist police in addressing an ONGOING EMERGENCY |
| (e.g., 911 calls describing an active shooter or fleeing assailant). |
| - ADMISSIBLE under standard hearsay exceptions without violating |
| Confrontation Clause. |
| |
| [ TESTIMONIAL ] |
| - Primary purpose is to establish or prove past events potentially |
| relevant to later criminal prosecution after emergency has dissipated. |
| - Examples: Formal police station affidavits, structured interrogations, |
| forensic lab certificates/reports (Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming). |
| - INADMISSIBLE unless declarant unavailable + prior cross-examination. |
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The Bruton Rule (Bruton v. United States)
In a joint criminal trial, the introduction of a non-testifying co-defendant's out-of-court confession that directly implicates the other defendant violates the Confrontation Clause, even if the trial judge gives a limiting jury instruction.
- Redaction (Gray v. Maryland, Samia v. United States): Redacting a co-defendant's confession by replacing the defendant's name with neutral terms (e.g., "another person") or non-obvious references is permissible only if the statement is not directly accusatory on its face.
5. Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause
The Fifth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
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| DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOCTRINE |
| |
| 1. ATTACHMENT OF JEOPARDY: |
| - Jury Trial: When the jury is EMPANELED AND SWORN. |
| - Bench Trial: When the FIRST WITNESS IS SWORN. |
| - Guilty Plea: When the court ACCEPTS the plea unconditionally. |
| |
| 2. THE SAME OFFENSE TEST (Blockburger v. United States): |
| Two crimes are NOT the same offense if EACH statutory provision |
| requires proof of an ADDITIONAL ELEMENT that the other does not. |
| - Greater and Lesser-Included offenses are the SAME offense (e.g., |
| Robbery and Larceny). Prosecution for one bars prosecution for other.|
| |
| 3. PERMITTED RETRIALS (Exceptions to Double Jeopardy Bar): |
| [+] Hung Jury (Mistrial declared due to Manifest Necessity). |
| [+] Mistrial requested by defendant (unless bad-faith prosecutorial |
| goading under Oregon v. Kennedy). |
| [+] Successful Defense Appeal (Reversal on error/procedural grounds). |
| * EXCEPTION: Reversal based on INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE operates |
| as an acquittal; retrial is strictly BARRED (Burks). |
| [+] Breach of Plea Agreement by defendant (Ricketts v. Adamson). |
| |
| 4. DUAL SOVEREIGNTY DOCTRINE (Gamble v. United States): |
| Successive prosecutions for the EXACT SAME CONDUCT by separate |
| sovereigns (e.g., State and Federal Gov, or State A and State B) do |
| NOT violate Double Jeopardy. (Municipalities are NOT separate from |
| their states). |
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The Blockburger Element-Matching Test
To determine whether two offenses are the same under Double Jeopardy:
- Offense 1 Elements: A + B + C
- Offense 2 Elements: A + B + C + D
- Result: Offense 1 is a lesser-included offense of Offense 2. Because Offense 1 does not require proof of an additional element beyond Offense 2, they are the same offense under Blockburger. Prosecuting a defendant for Offense 1 bars subsequent prosecution for Offense 2 (and vice versa) after jeopardy has attached (Brown v. Ohio).
A defendant was formally indicted for armed robbery and retained defense counsel. Two weeks later, while the defendant was released on bail, police instructed an undercover informant to engage the defendant in conversation at a local diner and deliberately elicit information regarding an unrelated, uncharged residential burglary. The informant recorded the defendant admitting to the burglary. The defendant moves to suppress the recording in his subsequent trial for burglary on Sixth Amendment grounds. How should the court rule?
During a custodial interrogation regarding a homicide, a suspect was properly advised of his Miranda rights and signed a written waiver. After forty-five minutes of questioning, the suspect stated: 'I think I'd better speak with an attorney before I say anything else.' The interrogating detective continued questioning without pausing, and ten minutes later, the suspect confessed to the murder. The suspect moved to suppress the confession under the Fifth Amendment. Should the court grant the motion to suppress?
A defendant was prosecuted for grand larceny in a state jury trial. After the jury was empaneled and sworn, but before any witnesses were called, the trial judge discovered that the prosecutor had inadvertently failed to include a mandatory statutory witness certification. Over the defendant's objection, the judge dismissed the jury and declared a mistrial to allow the prosecutor to correct the administrative oversight. Two weeks later, the state re-indicted the defendant for the same grand larceny. The defendant moved to dismiss on Double Jeopardy grounds. How should the court rule?
A 911 dispatcher received an emergency call from a caller stating: 'My ex-boyfriend just kicked in my front door, pointed a handgun at me, and is running out the back alley right now wearing a green jacket!' Police arrived three minutes later, apprehended the man in the alley, and recovered a firearm. At the defendant's subsequent trial for aggravated assault, the caller was unavailable to testify. The prosecution offers the recording of the 911 call into evidence. Does admitting the 911 call violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause?