14.2 Defenses and Constitutional Rights

Domain 2 pairs defenses with constitutional rights because both are labeling problems on a criminal file. The PCCE asks which doctrine the facts raise and which amendment the motion cites. It does not ask you to deliver a closing argument. This is federal-and-general teaching. Insanity tests, castle-doctrine details, and many warrant-exception edges vary by state. Use the national picture below and flag variation when the stem is silent.

Justification: self-defense, defense of others, necessity

Self-defense is a justification. The defendant used force because of a reasonable belief that unlawful force was imminent. The force must be proportional. Deadly force is limited to a reasonable belief of imminent death, grievous bodily harm, or (in many jurisdictions) a listed forcible felony. Some states impose a duty to retreat before deadly force if retreat is safe; others are stand-your-ground. Castle doctrines often remove a retreat duty inside the home. Do not invent one national retreat rule.

Defense of others generally tracks self-defense if the defendant reasonably believed the third person had the right to use that force. Defense of property almost never authorizes deadly force to protect property alone.

Necessity (choice of evils) is a justification when the defendant reasonably believed the conduct was needed to avoid a greater harm, the harm was imminent, and the defendant did not create the emergency. Necessity is generally not a defense to an intentional homicide.

Exam tell. A shopkeeper who shoots a fleeing shoplifter in the back to save a pair of sneakers is not in self-defense territory. A driver who breaks a window to pull a child from a sinking car is a necessity picture.

Excuse and failure of proof: duress, insanity, intoxication, mistake, entrapment, alibi

Duress is an excuse: a person of reasonable firmness would have committed the crime because of an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm. Duress is generally not a defense to homicide. Necessity is choosing the lesser harm; duress is yielding to a human threat.

Insanity is an affirmative defense. Tests vary by jurisdiction. Do not recite one national statute.

• M'Naghten: the defendant, because of mental disease or defect, did not know the nature and quality of the act, or did not know the act was wrong.
• Irresistible impulse: the defendant could not control the conduct even if the defendant knew it was wrong.
• Durham: the conduct was the product of mental disease or defect (few jurisdictions).
• Model Penal Code substantial capacity: the defendant lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform conduct to the law.

A finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is not the same as incompetence to stand trial. Competency asks whether the defendant now understands the proceedings and can assist counsel.

Intoxication. Voluntary intoxication is generally not a complete defense. It may negate specific intent (no intent to permanently deprive; no intent to kill). It does not excuse a general-intent or strict-liability crime. Involuntary intoxication (unknowing, coerced, or unexpected from medication) can be a defense if it meets the jurisdiction's insanity-like standard.

Mistake of fact can negate mens rea. A specific-intent crime is the cleanest setting: if the defendant honestly thought the briefcase was his, there is no intent to steal. Mistake of law is generally not a defense. An official-statement exception sometimes exists if the defendant reasonably relied on a statute later held invalid or on an official interpretation. Do not treat a friend's legal advice as that exception.

Entrapment (majority subjective test) asks whether the government induced a person who was not predisposed to commit the crime. Opportunity is not inducement. The objective minority test asks whether police methods would induce a reasonable law-abiding person. Private-party persuasion, without government involvement, is not entrapment.

Alibi is not an excuse for a conceded act. It is a failure-of-proof claim: the defendant was elsewhere and therefore was not the perpetrator. Many jurisdictions require a pretrial alibi notice so the prosecutor can investigate. Missing the notice can limit the witness, not rewrite the Constitution.

Trap. Insanity is not the same as diminished capacity, incompetence, or voluntary drunkenness. Self-defense requires imminence and proportionality. Entrapment requires government inducement, not a sting that merely offers a chance.

Fourth Amendment: the short version

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrant must rest on probable cause and particularity and be issued by a neutral magistrate; a Terry stop requires only reasonable suspicion, while a full arrest requires probable cause. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable unless a recognized exception applies, and the exclusionary rule keeps unconstitutionally obtained evidence out of the prosecution's case-in-chief.

Section 14.3 covers the search-and-seizure doctrine in full — what counts as a search, each warrant exception, the digital-device rules, the limits on the exclusionary rule, and how a suppression motion is built and argued. Treat the Fourth Amendment as its own study block rather than as one item on the constitutional list.

Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

The Fifth Amendment includes the privilege against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and — in federal court — a grand-jury charging right that has not been incorporated against the states. Miranda warnings are required when there is custody plus interrogation. A volunteered roadside blurt is not a Miranda problem. Waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Double jeopardy bars a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or after a conviction that is final in the same sovereign. The Blockburger same-elements test is the usual same-offense label. Separate sovereigns (state and federal) may both prosecute. Jeopardy generally attaches in a jury trial when the jury is sworn.

The Sixth Amendment supplies the criminal-trial package:

• Counsel at critical stages once the right attaches (formal charge, indictment, information, or arraignment). Gideon v. Wainwright requires appointed counsel for an indigent felony defendant; later cases extend the right when actual imprisonment is imposed.
• Speedy trial (constitutional balancing plus separate statutory clocks that vary).
• Public trial.
• Confrontation of adverse witnesses (Crawford conceptually: testimonial hearsay is out unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior chance to cross-examine).
• Compulsory process to obtain defense witnesses.
• An impartial jury for serious offenses.

The Eighth Amendment forbids excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment. Bail is not required in every case; it cannot be set in an amount that is excessive in light of the government's interests. Cruel-and-unusual doctrine is a high-level punishment limit, not a daily suppression tool.

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause is how most of the Bill of Rights binds state actors (incorporation). The federal grand-jury clause is the famous non-incorporated piece: a state may charge a felony by information after a preliminary hearing. When a PCCE stem is a state prosecution, do not demand a grand-jury indictment as a matter of federal constitutional law.

Term-swap. Probable cause is the arrest and warrant standard. Reasonable suspicion is the Terry standard. Beyond a reasonable doubt is the trial burden, not the search standard. Miranda is Fifth Amendment custody-plus-interrogation, not a Fourth Amendment warrant rule. Incorporation is Fourteenth Amendment vocabulary.