7.3 The European Parliament: Democratic Oversight & Co-Decision

7.3 The European Parliament: Democratic Oversight & Co-Decision

Official Reference: Notice EPSO/AD/427/26 – Administrators (AD 5), Section 4.3.2(c): a 30-question EU knowledge test on "the EU, its institutions, procedures, and the main policies", taken in Language 2 in Part 2 of the testing phase.

The European Parliament (EP) embodies the democratic principle of representative democracy enshrined in Article 10(2) TEU: "Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament." Originally established under the 1951 Treaty of Paris as the consultative "Common Assembly" composed of delegates appointed by national parliaments, it was transformed in June 1979 by the introduction of direct universal suffrage.

Successive treaty revisions—culminating in the Treaty of Lisbon—elevated the European Parliament into a co-equal legislative and budgetary branch alongside the Council. For the EPSO AD5 candidate, key examination competencies include the mathematical mechanics of degressive proportionality, political group thresholds, the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), budgetary discharge under Article 319 TFEU, and the procedural rigor of the motion of censure under Article 234 TFEU.

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Composition & Degressive Proportionality (Article 14 TEU)

The Constitutional Ceiling & Seat Limits

Under Article 14(2) TEU, the composition of the European Parliament is governed by strict constitutional boundaries:

• Statutory Ceiling: The number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) "shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty, plus the President" (a maximum total ceiling of 751 members).
• Minimum Representation: No Member State shall be allocated fewer than 6 seats (applied to Malta, Luxembourg, and Cyprus).
• Maximum Representation: No Member State shall be allocated more than 96 seats (applied to Germany, the most populous Member State).

The Principle of Degressive Proportionality (Proportionnalité Dégressive)

Representation of citizens is degressively proportional:

1. The more populous a Member State is, the greater the total number of seats it is allocated in Parliament.
2. Conversely, the more populous a Member State, the more citizens each of its MEPs represents.
3. A less populous Member State receives fewer total seats, but each of its MEPs represents fewer citizens (e.g., in Malta, one MEP represents roughly 95,000 citizens, whereas in Germany, one MEP represents approximately 870,000 citizens).

Post-Brexit & 2024–2029 Term Composition

Following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 31 January 2020, 27 of the UK's former 73 seats were re-allocated to 14 under-represented Member States to better respect degressive proportionality, while 46 seats were placed in reserve for future enlargements or a potential transnational constituency. For the 2024–2029 parliamentary term, by European Council Decision (EU) 2023/2061, the total number of seats was fixed at 720 MEPs.

Electoral Systems & Direct Universal Suffrage

MEPs are elected for a five-year term by direct universal suffrage based on free and secret ballot:

• Common Electoral Principles: Council Decision 2002/772/EC mandates that elections must be based on proportional representation, using either the party-list system or the Single Transferable Vote (STV).
• National Thresholds: Member States may establish a minimum threshold for the allocation of seats, but this statutory threshold cannot exceed 5% of the votes cast.
• Incompatibilities: Under the 1976 Electoral Act, the office of MEP is strictly incompatible with being a member of a national government, a member of the Commission, a judge of the CJEU, a member of the Court of Auditors, an official of EU institutions, or a member of a national parliament (dual mandate prohibition).

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Organization & Working Methods

               EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: INTERNAL ARCHITECTURE
               
    [Plenary Session (Strasbourg - 12 Part-Sessions per Year)]
         ▲
         │ (Reports & Amendments Adopted)
    [22 Standing Parliamentary Committees (Brussels)]
    • AFET, ECON, ENVI, LIBE, BUDG, CONT, ITRE, IMCO, etc.
    • Led by Committee Chairs & Bureau (D'Hondt distribution)
    • Legislative Reports drafted by "Rapporteurs"
    • Political groups represented by "Shadow Rapporteurs"
         ▲
         │ (Coordinated Political Strategy)
    [Transnational Political Groups (EP Rules of Procedure)]
    • Minimum 23 MEPs from at least 1/4 of Member States (>= 7 States)
    • Sits by Political Ideology, NOT National Delegations!
    • Non-Attached Members (Non-inscrits) have limited speaking time

Transnational Political Groups (EP Rules of Procedure)

MEPs do not organize into national delegations (such as a French or Polish caucus); instead, they sit according to transnational political affiliation:

• Numerical Threshold: Under the European Parliament's Rules of Procedure, a political group must comprise at least 23 MEPs.
• Geographic Threshold: Those MEPs must be elected from at least one-quarter of the Member States (currently at least 7 out of 27 Member States).
• Institutional Advantages: Recognized political groups enjoy guaranteed speaking time in plenary debates, dedicated administrative secretariats funded by the EP budget, proportional representation on committee bureaus, and priority in drafting legislative reports.
• Non-Attached Members (Non-inscrits): MEPs who do not join an established political group sit as non-attached members with severely restricted procedural rights and resources.

Parliamentary Committees & The Rapporteur System

The primary legislative drafting and scrutiny occur within 22 standing committees (the 10th term upgraded the Security and Defence and the Public Health subcommittees to full committees in December 2024), such as the Committee on Budgets — BUDG, Committee on Budgetary Control — CONT, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs — LIBE:

• The Rapporteur (Rapporteur): A committee appoints an individual MEP as rapporteur to shepherd a legislative file. The rapporteur analyzes the Commission's draft proposal, consults stakeholders, drafts amendments, defends the committee report in plenary, and leads inter-institutional "trilogue" negotiations with the Council and Commission.
• Shadow Rapporteurs (Rapporteurs Fictifs): Each of the other political groups appoints a shadow rapporteur to negotiate compromise amendments with the lead rapporteur.

The Three Places of Work (Protocol No. 6)

Protocol No. 6 annexed to the Treaties defines the seats of the institutions:

1. Strasbourg: Official seat of the Parliament; hosts the 12 monthly four-day plenary part-sessions per year, including the annual budget session.
2. Brussels: Hosts additional plenary part-sessions, all parliamentary committee meetings, and political group meetings.
3. Luxembourg: Hosts the General Secretariat and administrative services.

Tripartite Powers: Legislative, Budgetary & Supervisory

Under Article 14(1) TEU, "The European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall carry out functions of political control and consultation as laid down in the Treaties."

1. Legislative Powers

• Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP, Article 294 TFEU): Formerly known as the co-decision procedure (codécision), the Lisbon Treaty made OLP the default law-making mechanism across more than 85 policy areas. Under OLP, the European Parliament and the Council act as co-equal bicameral legislators. Neither institution can enact a legislative act without the explicit consent of the other.
• Consent Procedure (Procédure d'Approbation): In specific cases, Parliament must grant its consent before a legal act can take effect. Parliament can accept or reject the text as a whole, but cannot amend it. Consent is mandatory for:
  • Accession of new Member States (Article 49 TEU);
  • Association agreements and major international trade agreements (Article 218(6) TFEU);
  • The Multiannual Financial Framework regulation (Article 312(2) TFEU);
  • The Article 7 TEU sanctions mechanism for breach of EU values.
• Consultation Procedure (Procédure de Consultation): A special legislative procedure where the Council must formally consult Parliament before voting, but is not legally bound by Parliament's opinion. However, under CJEU case law (Case 138/79 Roquette Frères), the Council's failure to wait for Parliament's opinion constitutes an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, rendering the measure void.
• Indirect Legislative Initiative (Article 225 TFEU): Parliament may, acting by a majority of its component members, request the Commission to submit any appropriate legislative proposal. While the Commission is not legally bound to propose the measure, it must give detailed reasons if it refuses.

2. Budgetary Powers (Articles 314 & 319 TFEU)

Along with the Council, Parliament constitutes the Joint Budgetary Authority of the Union:

• Abolition of Expenditure Distinctions: The Treaty of Lisbon eliminated the historic distinction between "compulsory expenditure" (where Council had final say, mainly agriculture) and "non-compulsory expenditure" (where Parliament had final say). Parliament now exercises equal co-decision over all EU spending.
• Definitive Adoption: Under Article 314(9) TFEU, when the budgetary procedure is completed, the President of the European Parliament formally declares that the budget has been definitively adopted, bringing it into legal force.
• Rejection of the Budget: Under Article 314(7) TFEU, Parliament can reject the joint text agreed in the Conciliation Committee by a majority of its component members; the Commission must then submit a new draft budget. (The old two-thirds rule for rejecting the whole budget predates the Lisbon Treaty.)
• Exclusive Budgetary Discharge (Décharge, Article 319 TFEU): The European Parliament holds the sole constitutional prerogative to grant discharge to the Commission for the execution of the annual budget, acting upon a recommendation from the Council (which acts by QMV). Based on the European Court of Auditors' Annual Report and Statement of Assurance (DAS), the discharge represents Parliament's formal political approval that funds were spent legally, regularly, and in line with sound financial management.

3. Supervisory & Scrutiny Powers

Parliament exercises democratic oversight across the executive branch:

• Parliamentary Inquiries (Article 226 TFEU): At the request of a quarter of its component members, Parliament may set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law.
• Written and Oral Questions (Article 230 TFEU): The Commission must reply orally or in writing to questions put to it by Parliament or its members. Council questions are answered according to Council arrangements.
• Election of the European Ombudsman (Article 228 TFEU): At the start of each parliamentary term, Parliament elects the European Ombudsman, who investigates complaints concerning maladministration within EU institutions, bodies, and agencies.

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Scrutiny Over the Executive & The Motion of Censure (Article 234 TFEU)

Parliamentary Scrutiny Over the College

Beyond the formal investiture vote under Article 17(7) TEU, Parliament exercises rigorous scrutiny over the executive through public confirmation hearings of Commissioners-designate:

• Individual nominees appear before the relevant parliamentary committees for a 3-hour televised cross-examination.
• Committees vote on evaluation letters assessing the nominee's competence and integrity.
• Although Parliament cannot formally vote down an individual Commissioner during the final plenary investiture (which covers the College as a whole), committee rejections create overwhelming political pressure, repeatedly forcing Member States to withdraw candidates or forcing the President-elect to reshuffle portfolios (e.g. Rocco Buttiglione in 2004, Alenka Bratušek in 2014, Sylvie Goulard in 2019).

The Motion of Censure (Motion de Censure, Article 234 TFEU)

The ultimate constitutional weapon of democratic control is the Motion of Censure against the Commission:

                  MOTION OF CENSURE LIFECYCLE (Art. 234 TFEU)
                  
  1. TABLING THE MOTION
     • Must be tabled by at least 1/10 of EP Component Members
     
  2. MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
     • Vote may NOT occur until AT LEAST 3 DAYS after tabling
     • Debate must be open and public
     
  3. STRICT DOUBLE MAJORITY VOTING THRESHOLD
     • 2/3 Majority of the Votes Cast, AND
     • Majority of the Component Members of the European Parliament
     
  4. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES
     • Members of the Commission MUST RESIGN COLLECTIVELY as a body
     • HR/VP must resign from Commission duties
     • Commission handles day-to-day business until replacement

• Tabling Threshold: A motion of censure must be submitted by at least one-tenth of the component members of the European Parliament.
• Mandatory Cooling-Off Period: To prevent impulsive votes during political crises, Article 234 TFEU explicitly dictates that the vote on the motion of censure shall not take place until at least three days after it was tabled.
• Rigorous Double Majority: To be carried, a motion of censure requires an exceptionally high double hurdle:
  1. A two-thirds majority of the votes cast; and
  2. A majority of the component members of the European Parliament (e.g. at least 361 votes in a 720-member house).
• Legal Consequences:
  • If the motion of censure is carried, the members of the Commission must resign collectively as a body.
  • The High Representative must resign from their duties in the Commission (though remaining in their Council post until the European Council acts).
  • The Commission remains in office in a caretaker capacity, dealing with current business (affaires courantes) until a new Commission is formally appointed.

Historical Precedent: The Santer Commission Resignation (1999)

No motion of censure has ever secured the required double majority, but the threat of censure produced a major constitutional crisis. In December 1998 Parliament refused to grant discharge for the 1996 budget. A motion of censure failed in January 1999, but Parliament and the Commission agreed to appoint a Committee of Independent Experts. Its report on fraud, mismanagement and nepotism was published on 15 March 1999, and Commission President Jacques Santer and the entire College resigned that night. This set a lasting precedent for political accountability to Parliament.