1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements
Key Takeaways
- The Digital Vault must be installed as a standalone workgroup server and never joined to an Active Directory domain to prevent directory compromises from breaching the Vault OS.
- CyberArk post-installation hardening scripts strip the Windows host of unnecessary services, disabling Print Spooler, LanmanServer (SMB), Remote Registry, and interactive RDP.
- The Windows Defender Firewall on the Vault blocks all incoming network traffic across all interfaces except inbound TCP port 1858 from explicitly whitelisted component IP addresses.
- Outbound network traffic from the Vault is restricted to predefined integration channels configured in DBParm.ini, including SIEM syslog (514/6514), NTP (UDP 123), and RADIUS (UDP 1812).
- Standard client PSM connections require end-user workstations to route RDP over TCP port 3389 to the PSM jump server, which establishes an isolated secondary RDP connection to the target.
1.2 Vault OS Hardening, Network Isolation & Port Requirements
Quick Answer: The CyberArk Digital Vault is a dedicated security appliance built on Windows Server, hardened via automated PowerShell scripts that eliminate non-essential services, roles, and protocols. The Vault must remain a standalone Workgroup server and never join an Active Directory domain, preventing domain-level compromises (such as Golden Tickets or compromised Domain Admins) from affecting the Vault host. Network isolation is enforced by the Windows Defender Firewall, which blocks all inbound traffic except TCP port 1858 from authorized component IPs, while disabling remote access protocols including RDP and SMB.
The Standalone Workgroup Mandate
A foundational requirement on the CyberArk PAM-DEF exam is that the Digital Vault server must NEVER be joined to an Active Directory (AD) domain. It must always operate as a standalone server in a local Windows Workgroup.
The technical justifications include:
- Eliminating Transitive Privilege Escalation: If the Vault were domain-joined, Active Directory
Domain Adminswould automatically gain membership in the Vault localAdministratorsgroup. Any attacker who compromised a Domain Controller or forged a Kerberos Golden Ticket would obtain administrative control over the Vault host operating system. - Preventing Group Policy Overrides: Domain-joined servers apply Group Policy Objects (GPOs) from domain controllers. Malicious or misconfigured enterprise GPOs could overwrite CyberArk local security policies, re-enable disabled services (such as SMB or Remote Registry), or weaken audit logging.
- Eliminating Domain Protocol Vulnerabilities: Operating in a domain forces participation in Kerberos and NTLM handshakes, exposing the Vault to credential relay attacks, Kerberoasting, and memory-based ticket extraction.
Directory integration for user authentication is performed at the application layer, not the OS layer. The Vault acts as an LDAP/LDAPS client querying Active Directory over TCP port 389/636, remaining an isolated cryptographic island at the host OS level.
CyberArk OS Hardening Framework
During and after installation, CyberArk executes automated hardening scripts (Hardening.ps1 and PostInstall.ps1, alongside security templates) to strip Windows Server down to a least-privilege appliance profile.
1. User Rights & Local Policies
- Deny Network Access: The
Access this computer from the networkright is revoked for standard accounts, whileDeny access to this computer from the networkis enforced. - Console-Only Logon: Logon rights are restricted strictly to
Allow log on locallyat the physical or hypervisor console for the local Administrator. - Deny Remote Desktop: The
Allow log on through Remote Desktop Servicesright is cleared, and Remote Desktop is disabled.
2. Registry Hardening & Protocol Lockdown
- Protocols Disabled: SMBv1, SMBv2, NetBIOS over TCP/IP, and LLMNR are deactivated across all adapters.
- Authentication Standards: LanManager and NTLMv1 are blocked, enforcing strict NTLMv2 with 128-bit minimum session security.
- Anonymous Enumeration: Strict settings block anonymous enumeration of SAM accounts and shares (
RestrictAnonymous = 2).
3. Disabling Non-Essential Services
Windows services outside the core PrivateArk engine are disabled:
| Service Name | Windows Identifier | Security Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Print Spooler | Spooler | Mitigates remote code execution exploits (e.g., PrintNightmare). |
| Server Service | LanmanServer | Disables SMB file sharing (TCP 445), stopping lateral movement. |
| Workstation | LanmanWorkstation | Blocks outbound SMB connections to external network shares. |
| Remote Registry | RemoteRegistry | Prevents network querying or editing of the Windows registry. |
| Remote Desktop | TermService | Closes RDP listener (TCP 3389); console-only access allowed. |
| Secondary Logon | seclogon | Blocks process execution under alternate credentials (RunAs). |
| Windows Audio | AudioSrv | Strips unnecessary multimedia services to reduce attack surface. |
| Error Reporting | WerSvc | Prevents automated transmission of memory dumps or telemetry. |
Automatic Windows Update reboots are disabled via local policies; OS patching requires manual maintenance and database health verification.
Vault Network Isolation & Firewall Architecture
CyberArk takes complete control over the native Windows Defender Firewall:
- Inbound Lockdown: All default inbound rules are removed. The firewall blocks all unsolicited inbound packets across all interfaces.
- The Sole Inbound Exception: A single inbound rule permits TCP port 1858 (PrivateArk Server), strictly restricted to static IP addresses of authorized CyberArk components (PVWA, CPM, PSM, PSMP, AAM, DR Vault). Packets from unlisted IPs are dropped.
- Outbound Lockdown: All outbound traffic is blocked by default, with exceptions explicitly defined in
DBParm.ini.
Authorized Outbound Integration Ports
Specific outbound rules support enterprise integrations:
- SIEM / Syslog: UDP 514, TCP 514, or TLS 6514 outbound to SIEM platforms (Splunk, QRadar, Sentinel) for real-time audit streaming.
- NTP: UDP 123 outbound to time servers. Clock skew exceeding 5 minutes invalidates MFA tokens, SAML assertions, and Kerberos tickets.
- SNMP Traps: UDP 162 outbound for operational monitoring alerts.
- RADIUS MFA: UDP 1812 or 1645 outbound for multi-factor authentication.
- SMTP Alerts: TCP 25 outbound to internal mail relays for Event Notification Engine (ENE) notifications.
- LDAP / LDAPS: TCP 389 / 636 outbound to Domain Controllers for user authentication.
- DR Replication: TCP 1858 between DR Vault and Primary Vault (DR Vault initiates inbound to Primary).
Component Port Requirements Matrix
The port topology across the PAS ecosystem is a primary focus on the Defender exam:
| Source | Destination | Port / Protocol | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| User Browser | PVWA Server | TCP 443 (HTTPS) | Web portal access, REST API, session launch. |
| User Workstation | PSM Server | TCP 3389 (RDP) | Direct RDP connection to PSM jump host. |
| User Client | PSMP Server | TCP 22 (SSH) | Native SSH connection to Linux proxy. |
| PVWA Server | Digital Vault | TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) | Safe queries, user auth, policy retrieval. |
| CPM Server | Digital Vault | TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) | Task polling and credential updates. |
| PSM Server | Digital Vault | TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) | Token validation, secret retrieval, recordings. |
| PSMP Server | Digital Vault | TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) | Fetching credentials, audit upload. |
| AAM Provider | Digital Vault | TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) | Local credential cache synchronization. |
| CPM Server | Target Windows | TCP 445 / 135 (SMB/RPC) | Password changes, verification, reconciliation. |
| CPM Server | Target Linux | TCP 22 (SSH) | Password and SSH key management. |
| PSM Server | Target Windows | TCP 3389 (RDP) | Proxied administrative RDP session. |
| PSM Server | Target Linux | TCP 22 (SSH) | Proxied SSH sessions via client tools. |
| DR Vault | Primary Vault | TCP 1858 (PrivateArk) | Database and safe replication via PADR. |
Why does CyberArk mandate that the Digital Vault server be installed as a standalone workgroup server rather than joined to an Active Directory domain?
During post-installation hardening of a CyberArk Digital Vault, what inbound network port is left open on the local Windows Defender Firewall for component communication?
When an end user accesses the PVWA to launch a privileged RDP session to a target Windows server via Privileged Session Manager (PSM) using standard client-based connection, what network traffic flows occur between the user workstation, PSM, and the target?